On March 8th, 1905, the Italian Consul in Addis Ababa, Count Colli di Felizzano, informed his superiors in Rome about a large mining concession that Emperor Menelik had just granted to a feckless Italian adventurer, Alberto Prasso. Colli doubted the concession territories contained any potential mineral wealth, let alone the ability of Prasso – a seemingly ignorant man who frequently took off on his prospections with only a few African guides – to realize its potential. Nevertheless, Colli cautioned that it would be a pity if wealthy foreign investors snatched the concession from Italian hands. For Colli, the estimated 70,000km2 concession in the contested southwestern border region was tantamount to obtaining a small slice of Ethiopia for la grande patria, just less than a decade after Italy’s defeat at Adwa in 1896. From 1905 to 1935, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its representatives hungrily eyed Prasso’s concession and his company. Analyzing Prasso’s rapport with Ethiopian elites and workers, European financiers, and the Italian government, Noelle Turtur examines the evolution of Italian colonial strategy from the liberal government to the fascist regime. Both liberal Italy and fascist Italy sought to control Italian concessions such as Prasso’s as a means of extending their commercial and political influence, with the expectation that one day it could be leveraged into imperial power. Italian imperialists shared the belief that Italian enterprises in Ethiopia, financed through a combination of state and private capital, could be used to secure Italian interests and engage the Italian population in colonial projects. While these ideas remained consistent, the fascist regime was willing to act much more decisively than the liberal regime.
So good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to 
our winter speaker series at the Center for  
European and Russian Studies at UCLA. And also, 
happy Valentine's Day! I'm Laurie Kain Hart,  
Faculty Director of the Center and professor 
of anthropology and global studies.  
So thanks to our audience for joining us 
today and to our wonderful speaker and  
respondent whom I will introduce in a moment.
As is our custom here at UCLA, I want to  
acknowledge that we are here on the unceded 
territory of the Gabrielino/Tongva peoples  
who are the traditional land care takers of the 
Los Angeles Basin and South Channel Islands.  
As a land grant institution occupying 
this ground, we pay our respects to the  
ancestors, elders and all relatives and 
relations past, present and emerging. 
I'd also like to thank our Center's 
Executive Director Liana Grancea,  
and Outreach Director Lenka Unge, for 
their contributions to today's event.  
We at the Center are especially interested 
in understanding the global, transnational  
and of course, imperial and colonial past and 
present of Europe's global context and impact.  
Today's lecture on the evolution of 20th 
century Italian imperialism in Ethiopia,  
in the context of both liberal and fascist 
governments, speaks directly to that mission 
and we're grateful to professor Turtur 
for sharing her research with us.  
So let me introduce her. Dr. Noelle Turtur is 
Eugen and Jacqueline Weber Postdoctoral Scholar  
in European History at UCLA. Her research 
focuses on the relationship between migration,  
business and imperial power. Her manuscript 
“Making Fascist Empire Work: Italian Enterprises,  
Labor, and Organized Community in Occupied 
Ethiopia, 1896 to 1943” analyzes the role  
of Italian enterprises in the Italian 
colonial project in the Horn of Africa. 
She received her doctorate in history 
from Columbia University in 2022.  
So we are also grateful to have with us 
respondent, Professor Hollian Wint. Professor  
Wint is assistant professor in the Department of 
History at UCLA. Her work spans the Indian Ocean  
from East Africa to the Indian subcontinent. 
Her first book project took her to archives  
in Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania, Gujarat and 
Bombay, as well as London and Washington, DC. 
She teaches on Africa and the Indian Ocean, 
the history and anthropology of money and debt,  
global history and the history of Islam. 
In both her teaching and research,  
she explores the intersection of gender, 
political economy and material culture,  
as well as innovative historical methods. 
So my thanks to both of you for being here.  
A note on logistics. Audience members 
can put their questions into the chat box,  
not the Q&A, but the chat box at the bottom of the 
screen at any time during the talk or discussion. 
And we'll ask the speakers to respond to 
as many of them as possible after the talk.  
So with that, I will turn the podium over to 
our speaker for The Unscrupulous Prospector,  
the Ethiopian Elite and Italy's Frustrated 
Imperialists: Alberto Prasso, and the Evolution  
of Italian Colonial Strategy in Ethiopia 
from 1905 to 1935. Thanks, professor Turtur.  
Thank you, everyone, for 
being here today.  
At 22 years old, Alberto Prasso, like so 
many Italians, set off to seek his fortune  
first in America. His life up until then had been 
nothing extraordinary. We know that he was  
born in May 1871 in Mongardino 
d'Asti, a Piemontese hill town of about  
and Prasso obtained a sixth-grade education. 
He left from La Harve and arrived at Ellis Island 
in December 1892, en route to join some relatives  
in Santa Cruz, California. Although Prasso arrived 
a few decades late for the California Gold Rush,  
there is no doubt that prospecting for gold became 
Prasso's lifelong obsession. After California,  
he went to Alberta and then to Alaska. In 1898, he 
was prospecting in the Transvaal in South Africa,  
and three years later he traveled up to Rhodesia, 
to Katanga in King Leopold's Congo Free State. 
A few years later, he arrived in Addis 
Ababa, taking the caravan from Djibouti,  
and he traveled along with an British officer 
who introduced the feverish prospector to the  
Ethiopian imperial court. According to Prasso's 
shine to the Italian adventurer. He appointed Ras 
Wolde Giyorgis, the governor of Kaffa and general  
in Menelik's southwestern campaigns, and Ras 
Tasemma Nadaw, the Amhara governor of Iluu Abbaboor,  
born to be his baldaraboch, or his 
patrons and intermediaries with the court. 
Between 1903 and 1905, Prasso accompanied 
Ras Wolde Giyorgis to Kaffa and throughout the newly  
conquered western regions of Ethiopia on a mission 
to lay down the telegraph and telephone line  
linking these regions to Addis 
Ababa. Over the next few years,  
Prasso took several trips to western Ethiopia 
to identify potential mineral deposits. While  
the Italian Legation in Addis would have certainly 
noted the arrival of another Italian in the city, 
by then, the population had dwindled substantially 
to just a few dozen, following the release of  
most Italian prisoners of war taken at Adowa, the 
Italian Consul Count Colli di Felizzano considered  
him just another speculator who, to paraphrase, 
was neither particularly cultured nor bright.
Yet Colli sat up with attention when 
Prasso walked into his office in March  
had been awarded by Emperor Menelik. 
The concession, according to Colli's 
letters to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  
granted Prasso the right to search for
precious metals in southwestern Ethiopia.  
The area is marked in red on the map, which 
Colli drew for the Ministry's reference. The  
concession, known as the Baro Concession, was later 
estimated to cover over 70,000 square kilometers.  
Colli doubted that Prasso would be able to turn 
that concession into a profitable enterprise. 
Likely, he even doubted Prasso would survive 
his prospections. The low-lying, water-logged  
regions were rife with tsetse flies and 
malaria, making the region difficult  
to traverse and inhospitable to both humans 
and pack animals. Further process would have  
to ingratiate himself to local authorities and 
people as Menelik's concession made clear that  
the court would not intervene on Prasso's behalf.
Menelik's control over the region at this  
period and time was limited at best. There was 
frequent conflict between the lowlander Anuyaa,  
the Oromo living in the high plateau, 
some of whom were strategically allied  
with Menelik's government for periods and 
the Amhara military governors appointed to  
rule rebellious people and exact tribute 
locally to support their imperial armies. 
Even if Prasso survived his prospections, the 
agreement granted him a mere three years to  
locate any precious metals and demonstrate that he 
could exploit them. A virtually impossible task.  
Nevertheless, the concession
caught Colli's interest for its   
sheer size and strategic position.
Lying along the contested border with  
the newly proclaimed Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and 
south of Lake Tana, Europeans' geographical  
knowledge of the region remained scant.
The British military and the Italian  
Geographical Society had both sent missions to 
study and map the region and its many rivers,  
including the Baro and the Birbir, that fed Lake 
Tana, which was the source of the Blue Nile.  
Moreover, these rivers produced new trade 
routes. The Baro river known as the Sobat  
in Sudan was navigable during the rains, and 
as a result, goods in southwestern Ethiopia  
could now travel to Khartoum and then 
up the Nile to the Mediterranean rather  
than overland across Ethiopia into the Red Sea.
The importance of these rivers to the Nile and  
this region's potential wealth in minerals,
as well as ivory, coffee, rubber and  
people made them particularly interesting 
to Emperor Menelik, as well as the British,  
who would do anything to ensure the steady 
flow of the Nile waters. The Italians and French,  
by contrast, understood that Britain's laser focus 
on the Nile waters offered up opportunities to  
carve out concessions for themselves in Ethiopia.
In 1906, the three European powers made a treaty  
dividing Ethiopia into zones of influence. The 
British surrounding Lake Tana. You can see... 
British surrounding Lake Tana, which would be 
this region here. The French controlling the  
rail line from Djibouti to Addis Ababa and the 
Italians were given kind of vague promises about  
Western Ethiopia. Prasso and this concession 
were thus of great interest to the ministry. 
Prasso, for one, for his knowledge of the region, its 
resources, politics and people in its concession  
as a concrete example of Italy's economic 
and political interest in its so-called
zone of influence. In his missive 
to Rome, Colli warned his superiors that it would  
"be a shame for the concession to fall into 
foreign hands." However unlikely, if  
Prasso ever managed to discover mineral riches 
in the area and then succeeded in obtaining a  
permanent concession to mine them, he would 
have immense tract of territory at his disposal. 
True, the concession was granted to Prasso as 
a private citizen and not as a representative  
of Italy, but to Consul Colli that was tantamount 
to obtaining a small slice of Ethiopia for  
la grande patria just a decade after Italy's 
failed attempt to occupy and colonize Ethiopia.
Over the next 30 years, the Italian Foreign 
Ministry and its representatives in Addis 
hungrily eyed Prasso's concession 
and the companies he formed from it. 
Colli deemed Prasso to be an unscrupulous and 
single-minded operator whose only goal was to  
exploit his concession. In other words, the man 
could not be trusted to further Italian imperial  
interests. Time and time again, the ministry 
attempted to secure Prasso's concession in Italian  
hands by trying to arrange for Italian investors 
to buy a controlling share of Prasso's company. 
With each disappointment, their appetite 
only grew. Studying Alberto Prasso and his  
strategically located concession from 1905 
to 1935, I trace the evolution of Italian colonial  
strategy in Ethiopia, from the immediate wake 
of the Italian defeat at Adowa in 1896,  
to the eve of the Italian invasion in 1935. Within 
these years, I identify three phases in Italian  
imperial strategy. The first I called emigrant 
imperialism, and dated roughly from 1896 to 1927. 
The second I referred to as economic 
penetration. And this was the language  
used precisely by the regime itself, and it dated 
from around 1927 to 1934. And the third phase,  
of course, was the violent occupation. 
And this began more or less in 1934 and 1935.  
Drawing on historian Mark Choate's concept of 
emigrant empire, I argue that emigrant imperialism  
relied upon small Italian entrepreneurs and 
adventurers like Prasso using their own  
resources, as well as local contacts and knowledge 
to develop enterprises in parts of the world  
like Ethiopia, Tunisia, Brazil and Argentina.
From the perspective of the Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs, supporting such enterprises required 
little attention and public resources. At worst,  
their legal troubles and various demands were 
headaches for the Italian legation. At best,  
an enterprise like Prasso's could bring an immense 
tract of territory under Italian influence and  
produce scarce gold for Italian state coffers. 
However, emigrant imperialists were unreliable. 
The government always doubted if their loyalties 
lay with the Madrepatria or if these men were  
more attached to their countries of settlement, 
or in Prasso's case attached to Ethiopia,  
or if they were only allied with their own kin 
and themselves. While emigrant imperialism was  
characterized by the Italian government aiding 
Italian entrepreneurs, emigrant entrepreneurs,  
and their varied and uncoordinated 
industries in hopes that these resulting  
enterprises might benefit the metropole,
economic penetration was state-sponsored  
coordinated investment in distinct regions. 
Economic penetration differed from emigrant  
imperialism on two major points. First, the 
fascist regime sought to aggressively draw in  
the capital and interests of Italian capitalist 
classes. These people and their capital,  
according to the regime's ideology, would provide 
the spiritual as well as economic and political  
basis for colonization. Second, the 
regime sought to strategically and intentionally  
target specific regions for exclusive 
Italian economic and political influence. 
Ultimately, economic penetration was 
intended to lay the groundwork for  
imperial expansion broadly defined.
Thus many commercial enterprises connected to 
this policy were involved in infrastructure  
projects such as roads and port facilities, and 
these companies engaged in espionage and built  
relationships with local elites in order to erode 
the central power of the Ethiopian imperial court. 
Finally, the Italian imperialists frustrated with 
their efforts, resorted to a violent invasion and 
direct occupation. Studying Italian colonial 
strategy in Ethiopia from the post-Adowa period  
to the eve of the fascist invasion also reveals 
certain continuities. First, Italian colonial  
strategy in the Horn of Africa was largely 
carried out by the same group of nationalists and  
experts affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Italian Geographical Society. 
These men were the experts on both the 
region, in both academic  
and diplomatic circles. For the most part, they 
were committed nationalists and imperialists who  
had no qualms of accommodating themselves 
within the fascist regime and pursuing the  
same policies more vigorously. Second, Italian 
colonial strategy in all three phases relied  
upon the labor, capital, and expertise of African 
Italians and members of the Ottoman diaspora. 
Italian imperialists in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs believed that Italian enterprises in  
Ethiopia, like Prasso's, could be financed 
through a combination of state and private  
capital and ultimately used to secure 
Italian interests and engage the Italian  
population in colonial projects. The rest of 
my book manuscript reveals these same kinds  
of common combinations persisted throughout the 
Italian occupation of Ethiopia from 1936 to 1941. 
Third, while illustrating the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs' persistent interests in Ethiopia  
and the escalating force they are willing to use 
to achieve their aims, I do not understand this as  
evidence of the regime's long-standing intention 
to invade and occupy Ethiopia. Rather, I argue  
that the Italian regime developed many strategies 
to destabilize and exploit Ethiopia and its people. 
They understood a military occupation as one 
among many of these strategies. Thus, as dead as  
this debate may be in Italian history, I think 
it is worth repeating, especially in the imperial  
context, and given current circumstances that 
the fascist regime and its strategy in Ethiopia  
did not represent a break with the policies 
pursued by the liberal Italian state. Rather,  
the fascist regime built on these strategies 
and was willing to carry them out with greater  
force and intention than its predecessor.
I am thus emphasizing the Italianness of  
this imperial strategy as opposed 
to its fascist particularities. So  
how did an Italian from Mongardino d'Asti 
obtain an extensive concession in western  
Ethiopia just a few years after the Italians' 
failed invasion? I argue that Alberto Prasso  
obtained its concession by the mere luck of being 
in the right place at the right time. But he was  
able to maintain his concession over many years 
by effectively tacking between his identities  
and connections with Ethiopia and Italy.
He was, in my opinion, the quintessential  
emigrant imperialist. Prasso spent his first 
years in Ethiopia conducting mineralogical  
surveys in the southwest, which Menelik was 
in this time attempting to incorporate into  
his empire through both brute force and strategic 
alliances. As a surveyor, Prasso frequently sent  
news and accounts of the people 
he met, the resources he saw,  
and the places he traveled to Ras Tasemma,
the Amhara governor of Iluu Abbaboor,  
and Ras Wolde Giyorgis, the governor of Kaffa. 
He even sent news to court. This information  
likely helped each of these men coordinate and 
conduct raids to extract tribute and punish  
local people who resisted their authority. Thus, 
from his first years in Ethiopia, Prasso likely  
served as an agent of the Ethiopian Imperial 
bureaucracy and its rule in southwestern Ethiopia. 
Similarly, I understand Menelik's decision to grant 
Prasso a concession, another strategy for  
extending the Ethiopian imperial rule into 
southwestern Ethiopia. Menelik granted numerous  
concessions, including to foreigners in this 
region in these years. Granting a concession  
gave substance to the Empire's territorial 
claims and allowed the court to collect new  
tax revenue without necessarily forcing the 
emperor to dedicate soldiers or to wage war. 
Concessionaires alone would be responsible for 
negotiating with people locally and rendering  
their enterprises profitable. It cost 
the emperor little to grant a concession,  
but if the concessionaire were 
successful, the emperor could  
rely on a secure flow of tax revenue from 
a region formerly outside of his control.  
While luck may have secured 
Prasso's concession initially, it was  
his skill as an emigrant imperialist that 
allowed him to keep it for the next 30 years. 
Like many Italian emigrants, Prasso cultivated 
ties with key people in his country of settlement,  
namely the emerging Ethiopian imperial 
bureaucracy, while maintaining his identity and  
status as an Italian and a European. His ability 
to engage with all three groups allowed Prasso
not only to keep his concession in the midst 
of immense political turmoil within Ethiopia,  
but also to manipulate a succession of financiers, who
were eager to obtain a share of Ethiopia's riches,  
but ultimately ignorant of the country.
The first person who tried to remove the  
concession from Prasso's hands was the Italian 
Consul in Addis, Colli. Count Colli repeatedly  
tried to interest reliable, patriotic Italian 
investors in becoming majority shareholders in the  
company, which Prasso formed to finance a survey 
missions and eventually exploit the concession.
As majority shareholders, the 
company in this concession
would remain in Prasso's hands in name only.
But Colli's aspirations were quickly dashed.  
Italians were reticent to invest in imperial 
ventures. Indeed, most Italians did not trust the  
banks, let alone the stock market, and preferred 
to invest in family businesses or real estate.  
To address this problem, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Italian imperialist  
developed various investment vehicles 
such as the Società Coloniale Italiana,  
which was founded in 1907. Backed primarily 
by capital from the Ministry of Finance, 
these companies were created to invest in 
concessions in Ethiopia and allow Italians  
to expand their commercial and political 
influence relative to the British and French.
Colli's attempts to interest these 
groups, however, were to no avail. No  
matter how reassured they might have been 
by government offices, first and foremost,  
they aimed to profit for their shareholders. Each 
time, these enterprises declined for two reasons. 
First, they could not invest the capital that 
Prasso demanded. And second, they deemed the  
investment too risky. They were unsure of the 
potential mineral resources in the region,  
and they were not convinced that Prasso could 
secure a permanent contract. In the Ministry of  
Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
ultimately did not have the leverage or if they  
did, the willingness to use it to force these 
companies to invest and process enterprise. 
Unable to attract Italian investors, Colli 
reluctantly realized that the legation had  
little choice but to support Prasso in 
his many legal battles with successive  
financiers. Between 1907 and 1921, Prasso's 
financiers included a Greek banker based in  
Alexandria named George Zarvudachi, the Italian 
Panelli brothers, likewise based in Alexandria,  
who were suspected of smuggling arms and 
other things in southwestern Ethiopia, 
and a group of British investors that included 
Miles Backhouse, the former governor of the  
Bank of Abyssinia, and John Ramsden, one 
of the largest plantation owners in the  
Straits Settlement, now known as Penang, and in 
British East Africa. Each of these partnerships  
quickly soured. Prasso financiers accused them of 
spending money irresponsibly, of overselling the  
concessions potential and of never using the money 
invested to actually begin mining operations. 
By all accounts, Prasso's included, he 
accepted this money but never began mining,  
let alone making the promised fixed capital 
investments needed to create an efficient,  
modern mining operation. Each in their turn sued 
Prasso for failing to abide by their agreements.
In these legal battles, Prasso used his 
knowledge of Ethiopian law and his  
connections in Addis to secure favorable outcomes.
But he did not rely on his Ethiopian allies alone.  
He also kept the Italian legation duly informed 
about his legal battles, which in turn defended  
Prasso against his foreign investors as a means 
of extending Italian influence. For example,  
when Prasso's first business partners, the Greek 
banker and the Italian smugglers, filed a lawsuit  
against him in the Mixed Tribunal in
Alexandria, Italy's local diplomatic  
representatives were alerted to the case 
by friend Ferdinando Martini, an important  
Italian statesman, diplomat in the Horn, and the 
former governor of the Italian colony of Eritrea.
Afraid that the concession might 
"fall into foreign hands," 
Martini encouraged the Italian authorities to, 
and I paraphrase here, interest themselves in  
the case, such that the concession, once freed 
from pending legal matters, could be placed in  
the hands of Italian capitalists. While there 
is no proof that this political intervention  
influenced the outcome of Prasso's lawsuits 
in Alexandria, it is worth noting that in  
both cases, the court sided with Prasso.
But the tribunal's decision once handed  
down was moot. The Ethiopian court had, in the 
intervening years, nullified Prasso's concession on  
the grounds that no work had been undertaken. With 
the contract nullified, Prasso requested a new  
concession covering the same area, which was 
granted. This maneuver thus freed Prasso of his  
legal obligations to give to his financiers, while 
also allowing him to develop the same concession. 
The episode reveals that Prasso was able to 
draw on his connections to the Italian Legation  
and the Ethiopian Imperial Court to defend his 
interests when challenged by foreign investors. 
Perhaps Prasso's emigrant imperialism can best 
be exemplified by his own family. In his memoirs,  
Prasso recounts being “given” a 
woman, who he calls Uoletta Miriam,  
although that certainly would had not been the name she 
was born with, who had been taken captive  
by a subordinate of Ras Wolde Giyorgis in a 
raid in the Omo delta in southern Ethiopia.  
Ouletta Miriam more or less remained with Prasso for 
the remainder of her life, serving as guide,  
translator, caretaker and concubine. 
She bore him a son, Adolfo, around 1906. 
Likely, Prasso saw his son's mixed heritage as 
an asset in that, Prasso believed, his cultural  
competencies and his heritage entitled him to 
an insider status in both Ethiopia and Europe.  
Unlike many Italians at the time, Prasso 
immediately registered Adolfo as an Italian  
citizen. He had also educated 
first in Addis Ababa in Alexandria before  
sending him to Europe to study in Turin and 
then at the Royal School of Mines in London. 
Prasso designated Adolfo as his heir, had 
him trained as an engineer and appointed  
him to direct the mine, as well as 
negotiate with European financiers.  
Over time, Prasso's ties with the Ethiopian 
imperial court appear to have grown stronger, even  
after his initial patrons, Ras Tasemma and Ras 
Wolde Giyorgis died and southwest Ethiopia became  
more closely enmeshed in the Ethiopian empire.
In November 1922, Prasso obtained a second  
concession, known as the Birbir Concession. 
This concession was much smaller, but much more  
wealthy. It included the mineral-rich region of 
Jubdo. In his memoirs, he credits Ras Tasemma's  
son, Dejjach Makonnen Endelkachew, with securing the 
concession on his behalf. At this point, Prasso  
must have felt quite secure in his influence.
Dissatisfied that the concession only allowed  
him to survey, and not exploit, he enjoined 
the Italian minister in Addis, Vivalba, to  
raise the matter with Ras Täfäri himself. 
Prasso also lobbied the court personally,  
and he eventually won his concession with the 
right to exploit whatever minerals he found. Thus,  
in these years, we see that Prasso 
single mindedly sought to secure and  
exploit his concessions in Western Ethiopia.
To that end, whenever he needed to make a new  
business deal or renew his concession, he used 
his knowledge of Ethiopia, its languages,  
customs and law, and his connections with certain 
members of the elite to his advantage. Likewise,  
Prasso was also aware of the strategic location 
of his concession and its importance to his  
native Italy. He thus counted on the Italian 
authorities to repeatedly intervene on his behalf.
As many emigrant imperialists before him,
Prasso tacked between his identity within  
Ethiopia and within Italy to secure 
his concessionary rights, which,  
if unintentionally, maintained Italy's claim 
to the Foreign Ministry in Western Ethiopia. 
Fascist regimes seizure of power in 1922 did 
not ultimately bring wholesale change to the  
Foreign Ministry or the Ministry of Colonies. 
The political appointees such as the Minister  
and the Undersecretary would change, but the 
offices were largely stacked with experts,  
such as the ethnologist Alberto Pollera, the orientalist Enrico Cerulli,  
and the diplomat Jacopo Gasparini, whose 
knowledge and contacts made them irreplaceable. 
Moreover, there was little need to replace these 
men. They were mostly patriotic nationalists  
who shared the fascist regime's ambition to 
solidify the nation's independence and power  
abroad by building an empire. As the fascist 
and the established diplomatic corps  
accommodated one another in Rome, they 
largely pursued an intensified version  
of the Liberal government's policy, using the same 
companies such as the Società Coloniale Italiana. 
Mussolini relied on nationalists such as Luigi 
Federzoni to direct foreign and imperial policy. 
As Minister of the Colonies, Federzoni 
called on “the courage of private capital” to  
undertake “audacious overseas enterprises”. 
Federzoni and others believe that Italian  
capitalists would provide the economic and 
political foundation for the colonization,  
as well as a kind of spiritual leadership.
Prasso and his mining concessions received renewed  
attention from the ministries after he arranged 
for his company to be presented as an investment  
opportunity to the Italian Geographical Society, 
Italy's most important imperial lobby presided  
over by Federzoni in early 1924. The concessions 
were made retain their strategic value, while their  
mineral value, material value increased as the 
Birbir Concession began to produce important  
quantities of platinum for the global market.
The concession thus remained valuable to Italy,  
but Prasso remained a liability. The ministry 
spent the next years trying to make the  
Italian electrochemical giant, the firm 
Montecatini, the majority shareholder  
in Prasso's company. They argued that the 
firm had the resources and expertise to  
exploit the mineral deposits and secure the 
concession rights on behalf of the regime. 
Montecatini was Italy's largest copper, pyrite, and 
fertilizer producer. In addition to fertilizers,  
the company operated hydroelectric 
power plants in Italy and Tunisia,
a French protectorate with a large Italian 
population. At the same time, Montecatini  
as securing an alliance with Mussolini 
that would make the firm the primary fertilizer  
for the nation during the Battle for Grain,
the regime's campaign for food autarky.
While the regime was working to 
aggressively interest Montecatini,  
Prasso was busy pursuing other investors. 
He dispatched Adolfo to negotiate with Paribas  
bank, which frequently collaborated 
with the Italians on foreign investments  
and charged him with forming a stock company 
with French investors to develop the Birbir  
Concession. Adolfo was also sent to London to 
see if he could interest investors there as well.
Perhaps considering how his prior investors had 
withdrawn so quickly, Prasso wanted to form  
multiple companies on his concessions, dividing 
it into multiple zones with respective rights in  
order to have a more conservative, secure footing.
Yet, Prasso responded enthusiastically  
when Colli informed him of Montecatini's 
intention to invest in Prasso's operations.  
He wrote to Colli that he was rushing to Rome 
to meet with Montecatini's representatives,  
delightfully weighed down by the 12 kilograms 
of metal he had mined that year. But news of  
Prasso's travels quickly dried up. Apparently, the 
Baro and Sobat river river became too shallow  
to navigate, effectively stranding 
him in Jubdo. Colli and the Italian Legation,
however, assumed Prasso would cancel his 
dealings with the French and the British  
as they had instructed and make an agreement 
with Montecatini. To ensure Prasso's concession  
was not canceled, Colli intervened directly with 
on Prasso's behalf with Ras Täfäri,  
informing him of the work Prasso  
had undertaken and the company that  
Prasso was about to form. 
Prasso, however, had other plans.  
He went ahead and formed his French company, 
approving it with the Ethiopian Minister of  
Mines, all the while keeping the Italian Legation 
in the dark by strategically bribing a postal  
worker in the Legation's telegraph office. The 
whole episode thus is largely reminiscent of  
Colli's attempts to interest companies 
in Prasso's concession a decade earlier. 
Except in this case, Prasso effectively 
served to deceive the Italians.  
While this time the regime was able to strongarm 
a suitable firm into investing, Prasso continued  
to operate as an emigrant imperialist, drawing 
on his connections and resources in Ethiopia,  
as well as the competition between European 
powers for economic influence in the region  
in order to make the most favorable deal.
And the Italian investors were simply not  
offering the best deal. Prasso in addition to 
his company with Paribas made agreements with two  
British companies and by 1932 was rumored to be 
in talks with Consolidated Goldfields, an immense  
British mining company with operations in the 
Transvaal, Australia, Siberia and the Americas.  
So this whole episode marks a turning point for 
Italian imperialists, at least with  
respect to the relationships to Prasso.
They grew increasingly convinced that the  
Ethiopian government was intentionally favoring 
the French and the British over  
Italian, but Federzoni sought to cool their 
heads. He argued that it remained in Italy's  
interest to work quietly through companies rather 
than create a diplomatic route. Frustrated by the  
fact that the Italians could not raise enough 
capital to finance concessions like the British,  
French, Germans and other imperial powers,
an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  
likely Count Luigi Orazio Vinci-Gigliucci, 
the future minister in Abbis, proposed in  
commission to study economic enterprises in  
Ethiopia and to systematically present enterprises to 
Italian investors. But such a commission would  
be able to kind of sift through requests and 
identify enterprises worthy of such investment. 
And here you can see some of Prasso's mining 
operations. Tracing how the Italians obtained  
possession of Prasso's concession reveals a 
subtle, yet significant transformation in Italian  
political strategy. The liberal and early fascist 
regime's desultory efforts to encourage private  
investment in imperial enterprises, developed 
into a muscular action plan that brought together  
skilled men from Italy's diplomatic corps in the 
financial class and specially designed investment  
vehicles, which combine public and private 
capital, all backed by the state's course of force.
Referred to by Italian diplomats 
themselves as economic penetration,
this policy aimed to use Italian 
investment to strategically and  
systematically target specific regions and 
resources for exclusive Italian influence.  
They engaged more Italian capitalists in 
undertaking and managing these enterprises.  
And finally, economic penetration served to 
erode the power of the Ethiopian imperial  
state. Many commercial enterprises connected 
to this policy aimed to construct and control  
key infrastructure such as roads and ports.
They also served as political cover for Italian  
agents to sow division between regional 
elites and the Ethiopian Imperial Court.  
This new imperial strategy and its relationship to 
previous strategies is best illustrated by Jacopo  
Gasparini, the central architect of the fascist 
regime's economic penetration and geopolitical  
action in the Horn of Africa. In 
his obituary, written by his fascist colleague,  
he is described as a man who was "born to 
the colonial politics of old Italy" and  
was still "attached to some
ideas of the surpassed  
tactics of the colonial administration."
As such, Gasparini could articulate  
the differences between the fascist Italy's 
new colonial strategies and that of its  
predecessors. This he summarized up as
"I worked for 20 years having  
only weak governments at my back and an Italy 
that didn't want any problems. Now we have at  
our backs a strong government and a strong Italy.
We all know how to take vigorous political action."  
Gasparini thus argued that Italian 
colonial strategy under the fascist regime  
did not differ from the liberals in terms of its 
content, but rather in terms of the resources, the time,  
men and money that they were willing to dedicate 
to pursuing their ambitions. Under Gasparini's  
leadership, the fascist regime's Ministry of 
the Colonies and Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
developed even more powerful companies such as the 
Società Anonima Patto Italo-Etiopico, simply known  
as SAPIE. Backed primarily by state capital,
like their predecessors, these companies also  
engaged private investors and entrepreneurs from 
Italy's dynamic industrial class. In the case of  
SAPIE, Gasparini brought in Antonio Marescalchi, 
a manufacturer of seaplanes who participated in a  
large consortium of manufacturers, banks, 
and airlines aimed at making Italy an  
international hub for air travel. Together, 
Gasparini and Marescalchi represented the new  
Italian imperialism, which merged Italy's dynamic 
industrial and financial class with its cunning  
liberal diplomats and bureaucrats who knew how to 
operate with little capital and little spectacle. 
Gasparini quickly dispatched Marescalchi to Paris, 
where he was to befriend Prasso, who was again in  
legal troubles with his French financiers and 
convince them to invest with the Italian SAPIE.  
Meanwhile in Rome, Count Vinci, soon to become 
the Italian Minister in Addis Ababa, sought  
to secure funding that SAPIE would need to 
buy the majority stake in Prasso's company. 
Vinci made two interrelated political and 
economic arguments. First, he argued that neither  
the British nor the French had abided by the 1906 
agreement, which he claimed had assigned Western  
Ethiopia to Italy. He argued that the British now 
were no longer interested in Lake Tana  
alone, but also in all of the Trinity tributaries 
feeding into the source of the Blue Nile. 
He suggested that Prasso's British partners 
were agents of the intelligence services.  
Secondly, he argued that Italy needed to secure, 
through immense financial extensions and force,  
if necessary, concessions like Prasso's in order 
to combat Britain and France's domination of  
the global economy. In particular, Britain's 
privileged place and its access to gold had  
produced financial capitalists to a degree 
unseen in Italy, which then invested in  
concessions like Prasso, which in turn brought 
more gold and more platinum to British shores. 
Citing the amount of gold acquired in the past 
two years by the British and French banks,  
Vinci argued that they were insulating their 
economies against global turbulence. Writing  
just a few weeks before Italy left the 
gold standard again in December 1934,  
Vinci's arguments about Italy's persistent 
structural disadvantages in the global economy,
even in its own zone of influence in remote 
Western Ethiopia, must have made Mussolini smart. 
State financing to push a private stock company 
to purchase a mine in western Ethiopia must  
have appealed as an apt solution to the problem 
that Vinci presented. Vinci concluded,  
"It is necessary to act if we do not want also 
this area of our interest to be irremediably  
compromised. We can no longer content ourselves 
with pieces of paper and the rights that these  
pieces of paper give us.
But we must look 
to give them substance by 
taking action. Like all other powers do,  
where they can and as they can, especially the 
British." Vinci's reports reveal the degree of  
resentment that many Italian officials, be 
they nationals, fascists or liberals, felt  
towards the British Empire. They argued that 
the British Empire size and resources created a  
structural inequality amongst the European powers, 
especially Italy, and that the British sought to  
obscure this under the mantle of individual 
rights, free trade and private enterprise. 
The thinking was that this inequality allowed 
Britain to take more than its fair share of the  
globe's resources, including gold and platinum, and that only 
an active, dynamic policy of coordinated public  
and private investment could
shift the scales in Italy's favor. 
Fully persuaded, the Ministry of Finance 
authorized increasing SAPIE's financing,  
not once, but twice in order to allow 
it to secure Prasso's French company. 
Ultimately, it was not the British firms that 
stood in SAPIE's way, but it was Prasso and  
his friends on the board of the French company. 
Twice, Marescalchi and Gasparini tried to obtain  
a majority share position in Prasso's French firm, 
and twice they failed. Only in 1935 did SAPIE manage  
to obtain the majority share first, because one of 
the British firms created as a subsidiary of the  
French company, had decided to end its contract.
And secondly, because Prasso's French investors,  
whatever their affection may have been towards 
Prasso himself, decided it was safer to go with  
the Italian group, seeing the escalation of 
conflict along the border between the Italian  
colony of Eritrea and Ethiopia. The experience, 
however, confirmed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
long held belief that Prasso, even now in his 
sixties, could not be trusted to place national  
interests over his single-minded pursuit of gold.
Moreover, Prasso's close ties to the Ethiopian  
government made him a threat to the company, 
which had been bought at such a high price and to  
the Italian invaders. A few months after SAPIE 
seized control of his company, Prasso was secretly  
arrested and imprisoned for two years. All of 
his business correspondence was sent through SAPIE's  
representatives in order to hide his arrest and 
ensure that Prasso did not manage to 
resecure his concession again, say by having 
Haile Selassie declare the concession void in  
re-awarding the same concession again to Prasso. 
As it happened, dozens of times within a year,  
the Italian army was pushing to occupy Prasso's 
concession using their informants and Jubdo,  
who included Prasso's son, to negotiate with 
the Ethiopian resistance comprised of the  
Western Oromo Confederation and the Ethiopian 
Provisional Government in Illu Abbaboor. 
Ultimately tracing the evolution of Italian 
colonial strategy from the turn of the century to
the occupation of southwestern Ethiopia in late 
little. What did change under the fascist was 
the Italian government's willingness to dedicate  
unprecedented resources and to use coercive 
force to substantiate claims to Ethiopia's land,  
people, and real or potential resources. In the 
immediate wake of Adowa, Italy used emigrant  
imperialists or concessionaires like Prasso to 
extend its commercial and political influence.
Emigrant imperialists provided 
interpersonal connections, local knowledge  
and linguistic and cultural competencies which 
were invaluable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
as it attempted to extend Italy's reach into 
overseas markets and its political influence. 
Yet the imperialists were dissatisfied with 
the kind of material and political gains that  
could be made using the strategy, especially in 
Ethiopia. In diplomatic treaties and negotiations,  
they perceived that their interests and 
so-called rights were constantly being  
subordinated to those of the British and French. 
This was matched by the fact that the Italians,  
even with the support and active engagement 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, could  
not force a marriage between an Italian 
capital and concessions like Prasso's. 
In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
sought to rewrite Italy's perceived structural  
disadvantage through economic penetration of the 
Ethiopian market or the targeted investment of  
specific regions and industries, backed by immense 
state financing, partnered with experts from both  
the ministry and private enterprise, as well as 
the convert coercive force of the fascist state,  
both within Europe and in Ethiopia.
The fascist regime was willing to use  
ever more men, money and force 
to achieve this end. Thank you.  
Thank you so much, Noelle, for that 
amazingly interesting and intricate landscape  
of imperialism and commercialism in Ethiopia.
And Hollian, let me turn to you for the  
commentary at this point. Thank you. Sure. Well, 
thank you, Noelle, for that fascinating exploration  
of the various stages, strategies and tensions 
of Italian Empire in the Horn of Africa. 
I'm going to keep my comments somewhat brief 
because I'm hoping that we'll have some great  
questions. And I'm going to warn everyone that 
I'm coming at this as an Africanist rather  
than a Europeanist. So I'm sure that some 
of the questions that I'm going to pose  
are going to be somewhat different from 
some of the Europeans' in the room. 
I'll start with one of the things that I 
thought was most compelling about the paper,  
which was actually the methodology. And so 
I think this is a really excellent example  
of how biography can produce micro histories of 
global dynamics. And so through this kind  
of rather juicy story of Alberto Prasso, I think 
it's actually more juicy in the written version,  
the chapter that I've read. But through
this story, you are able to trace  
both the financial networks and the often very 
intimate politics that formed what you're calling  
emigrant imperialism. So that's a new concept 
to me, this idea of emigrant imperialism.  
And I think it would be fruitful for us 
to unpack that a little bit further in our  
discussion today. And so in particular, when I 
was reading your paper and in listening to the  
presentation today, I found myself comparing 
the dynamics described to imperial contexts  
that I'm perhaps a bit more familiar with.
So I'm thinking here of work on various company  
states in South and Southeast Asia, and the 
sort of Creole societies that we've got in  
Batavia, for example. But also more recent work 
on international investments and European family  
firms this use of the term family firms, in 
intersecting Atlantic and Indian Ocean trades,  
including the financing of the 
Atlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades. 
And also, to a certain extent, these new 
histories of capitalism, a new histories  
of infrastructure and extractive economies 
in Africa. And so I guess my first kind of  
overarching comment or question really is about the 
utility and necessity of thinking across empires.  
So I think this is a particularly pertinent 
question for the Horn of Africa. As you show,  
this was a site of intense imperial competition.
So this is really a key space from which we  
might be able to counter or at least nuance the 
British-French bias of much of the scholarship  
on European colonialism in Africa. And so 
I'd like you to say, I'd like to invite you  
to say a little bit more about the position 
of Italian Empire in that historiography,  
and also to open up a broader discussion 
of the character of continuity between  
liberal and fascist empire that you're drawing.
And I've noticed in the beginning of your talk, you  
made a point that this was a sort of,
these were Italian strategies, you're  
really quite specifically talking about Italian 
Empire. But I do see comparisons across that. So  
I'd like to ask you to sort of say a bit more about 
how you are situating Italian Empire more broadly. 
I also thought it is very interesting that
towards the end, you're really kind  
of emphasizing the particular limits to Italian 
capital that maybe the British did not experience  
in the region. So that comparison, I think, 
is very useful in thinking across empires in a  
connected way as well as in a comparative one. 
But of course, the whole was not just the site  
of European empire, of competing European empires.
Perhaps in some ways the most important player in  
Prasso's story was the Ethiopian Empire. And you 
also allude to the Ottomans in the region, the  
long history of the Ottomans in the region. So 
I'd love to hear a little bit more about that.  
So, you know, we've been discussing this recently, 
the sort of Ethiopian exceptionalism, right? 
The idea of the Ethiopian Empire 
and also the sort of infrastructures that  
it put into place in the region are 
really at the heart of this, still  
I would say, somewhat pervasive idea of Ethiopian 
exceptionalism in the regional scholarship.  
So it's obviously been long celebrated as a rare 
African holdout against European imperialism.  
But this more recent scholarship has 
also investigated Menelik and his successors  
as their state, as an agent of colonialism 
itself, right? As a form of colonialism that  
is in some ways comparable to the European 
empires that are competing in the region. 
And my understanding 
of this is, this is particularly  
a scholarship that is concerned with 
Western Ethiopia, Southwest Ethiopia in  
terms of the region of expansion, but also 
a region of kind of continuing tributary  
relationships with existing states 
and local elites in the area.  
And so I was also interested in, you suggested, 
you made a comment about the relationships that  
the Italians were trying to establish 
with these local elites in Western Ethiopia. 
And so I think that would be something that would 
be interesting to hear more about. And also,  
I would like to invite you to kind of explain a 
little bit more about how you're intervening on  
complementing these histories of African empire
or non-European empire in the region.  
So I think there are two themes that really 
stand out in your paper that help us to think  
about empire in useful ways. The first is
what Fred Cooper et al.
have termed "the tensions of empire". And, you know, 
when I was writing this before, I was thinking  
that the Alberto Prasso's story really draws our 
attention to these tensions between the incessant  
mobility of capital and the imperatives of 
territorial control. But there's also a sort of,  
you know, that quote that you had on pieces 
of paper really got me thinking about also the  
kind of tensions one might have between kind 
of speculative capital and colonial capital. 
And so kind of these, I mean Prasso, he's 
such a interesting character. He's quite a  
naughty historical character in many ways. And 
he's sort of in tension with sort of conservative  
capitalists in the metropole as well. 
So there's several kind of tensions that I think  
his story brings out. The second is this question of 
intermediaries, which is a topic that's  
received quite a lot of attention in studies of 
indirect rule in Africa, or I think you allude  
to this idea of informal empire and this 
resurgence of interest in the informal empire. 
And obviously, Alberto Prasso, he relied very heavily 
on various kinds of African and possibly even  
Ottoman intermediaries. And it was 
these connections with patrons,  
rulers and enslaved Ethiopians, and the woman 
that he had a child with was very interesting  
to me. Obviously, these various kinds of 
relationships are really at the heart of  
his tense relationship with the Italian state.
But I also thought it was very interesting  
to kind of turn that question of intermediaries on 
its head somewhat and think about how if we unpack  
the imperial strategies of the Ethiopian state 
in perhaps a sort of a longer historical view,  
we can maybe think about how Prasso was also 
acting as an intermediary for the Ethiopian  
Empire and that is maybe a way into kind 
of thinking about the nature of the Ethiopian  
state and the ways in which it is interacting 
with other imperial projects in this moment. 
So that kind of returns me to method. I think, I 
mean, you've excavated a really impressive array  
of sources to build this picture of Alberto 
Prasso's life. And I do think that there is,  
I'm sure there's something to be said about 
what sources are available for writing this  
history from a different perspective, 
maybe more of an Ethiopian perspective. 
And I know this is not necessarily what you are 
most concerned about, but it is something that  
I'm interested in. And so one of the things that 
I guess I could, I want to ask you finally is to  
what extent can we maybe use a micro history 
of Prasso's life as a lens through which we  
can actually foreground more consistently the 
actions and opinions and conceptual frameworks  
of the Ethiopian actors, with 
which he is interacting. I am thinking there  
in terms of, there is some, at least in your, in 
what I've read, reference to his relationship to  
Ethiopian laborers, but also I got a sense that 
maybe he's also working with Ethiopian traders as 
well. And so just sort of trying to use 
this micro history in a way that gets at  
these varied actors in a different way. 
I'll leave it at that. Shall I respond?  
Thank you so much, Hollian. I want to discuss 
all of this more with you and have some book  
recommendations I'll ask for. But I think the 
best place to begin is kind of with more of a  
background on Ethiopia itself, which I kind of 
cut from this talk in part because of length. 
But Ethiopia and I think perhaps the most 
important historiographical source I was working  
from, as I was writing this case study,
is actually [. . .] PhD dissertation 
and he writes precisely following the
publishing of Neocolonialism and  
British Gentlemanly Capitalism 
and Overseas Expansion. And he's looking at  
the Gambella concession, which is a British 
trading post operated on the Baro River,  
but also comes up in his account because he's 
actually such a fake figure that because of his  
role as this intermediary, as you say, between 
the Ethiopian imperial state and this periphery  
and his status as a European, which in a sense 
gives him access in the way that other Ethiopians 
were not given access to European financiers 
and political circles. He's kind of continually  
brought up. So I also thought it was important 
to actually tell his story incomplete rather than  
necessarily have him always as this 
figure on the background.
So Ethiopia at this point in time, if we go 
back in history, you know, the 19th century,  
Egypt and the Ottomans are basically expanding 
down the Red Sea coast. And when the  
Ottomans basically fall back, the Italians come 
in and take over these posts. And so this is  
really much how the Italians become involved 
in East Africa, they see these ports  
like, it's just port cities, it's Massawa, it's 
Mogadishu, they see them as opportunities and  
then they slowly and slowly encroach further 
and further and towards Ethiopia. 
It's hard to say that was ever even, depending 
on who was in power, there was more or a more  
explicit and or a less explicit intention for 
conquest. 1896 is led by [. . .] and he
has this idea of conquest, but it's very kind of 
anomalous within the Italian state, which I think,  
you know, the concept of the emigrant empire here 
kind of comes in. And I returned to that in a minute. 
So when the Italians arrive, when Prasso arrives, 
kind of the most important people in Ethiopia  
are, not the most important people, but 
the people who are kind of creating networks  
linking the Horn to wider European markets, and 
the Indian Ocean, and wider African markets, are a  
number of people who have kind of come with the 
Ottomans and are part of the Ottoman diaspora. 
So this includes a lot of Greek, Jewish, kind 
of Leventine traders, Syrians who end up a kind  
of operating strategic posts within the Ethiopian 
government and within kind of Ethiopian commercial  
society as bankers, as custom house owners, 
including in regions like Illubabor.  
And so these are the people that Prasso is in a 
sense most akin to when he arrives in Ethiopia. 
And you can see that actually Prasso's 
predecessor and a predecessor concessionaire  
is the man who was a Manchester-born
Syrian named Hasid Ydibli,
who is operating basically as its own
personal fiefdom, this region.  
And he eventually gets transferred to [. . .]
to manage the tax revenue there. But  
it's really a way for the Ethiopian state, which 
doesn't quite hold these regions at this point. 
As you know, direct occupational control to extract 
tax revenue from them. And so this is kind of a  
way in which Menelik who understands kind of the 
limitations of his forces after 1896, is trying  
to hold on to this territory, as the British 
are claiming it, as the French are claiming it,  
by actually substantiating that 
territory through granting concessions. 
And if you look at Ethiopian law, kind 
of the very act of granting a concession is  
a claim to imperial sovereignty because of 
the way in which under Ethiopian law, land  
is basically all public domain that 
is then granted by the sovereign  
to be used in more or less in different 
indefinite periods to various individuals.  
So it's really this act of extending sovereignty.
So Prasso comes in as this intermediary. I do  
think he's very alike the Greeks and the Armenians 
and these various Ottoman intermediaries. And  
that's actually something that I bring up in 
my next chapter is how the Italians try to  
distance their settler population from these 
kinds of intermediaries, because that's very  
similar to Italian emigrant imperialism, 
what I call emigrant imperialism.
I think it's very helpful to kind of go 
back to the oldest history, the old renaissance  
history of Italian merchant capitalism. And in that 
Italians are migrant populations of a Genovese,  
they kind of travel around the world. They 
establish merchant houses and customs houses  
in various port cities. They're not necessarily 
interested in controlling vast amounts of land,  
particularly because they just don't have the 
resources, but rather in controlling kind of  
nodal points and trade that allows them to either 
make profits or to exact tax revenue. 
So that's really kind of the role that these 
immigrant imperialists are playing. They're  
establishing businesses, they're placing 
themselves as kind of networks that link the  
Metropole to various parts of the world. And it's 
not necessarily required a lot of state backing,  
no state risk involved, but it does generate state 
income in that these people send remittances. They  
establish companies that are engaged in trading 
with Italy and they kind of become important  
people locally like Prasso, who if Prasso had been 
so inclined, could have advocated for Italian  
interests with the Ethiopian Imperial Court. I 
actually have no idea whether he did or he didn't,  
simply because those archival records 
from the Ethiopian perspective are, to my 
knowledge, entirely... I think they 
exist, but I don't think they're available.  
Of course, there's maybe another way I can get 
about this, and I'm looking at published memoirs  
and papers and things like that to kind of 
understand who we interacted with, because he  
interacted with incredibly important people.
Ras Tasamma, in the last year of his life as the  
regent of Ethiopia after Menelik's death. 
So there should be archival evidence 
there. I just need to get through it.  
So I want to kind of speak to these kind of 
broader tensions and maybe I'll just kind of  
answer one of your questions and then we'll 
see if I can move on to Q&A, if there is any.  
I think it's really important to kind of lift the 
British and French bias and to also think kind of  
across empires and think about these continuities.
And that's kind of one of the exciting things  
about studying the Italian empire, is that 
precisely because of these capital shortages,  
it operates in a very different way. And in a 
sense it doesn't confine to our neat geographical  
borders. You know, this is the British Empire or 
this is the French Empire, and in a sense shows  
the certain porousness that might,
in my opinion, reflect a greater  
reality of what imperialism was and is.
And so that's why I like to look at capital  
and I like to look at businesses and I like to 
look at people. And so I think thinking about Italy  
and thinking also about Prasso's role in 
kind of substantiating and expanding as an  
intermediary of the Ethiopian empire really 
changes the kind of narrative of British  
and French contest over this region as kind of 
the headquarters of the Nile and responsible for  
feeding all of the Egyptian delta and
important agricultural investments there. 
So I'm going to stop there. If there's any 
other questions, we can keep going.
If there are other parts of what Hollian has 
just offered, I think you could continue to  
respond for the moment. Or Hollian, if you have 
interventions to make at this point, you as well.  
Yeah, the connection kind of cut, 
it was a little unstable at one point, 
so I didn't hear everything 
that Hollian said. Oh, okay. 
Particularly when you were talking about 
infrastructures and capital. Well, I was just  
sort of drawing comparisons between historiographies,
really, in terms there is a kind of a  
new burgeoning scholarship of the new history of 
capitalism in Africa, which is really interested  
in these questions of financial networks and how 
these are kind of facilitating really forms of  
what we used to call neocolonialism.
And you use the term neocolony at one  
point in your paper and I was just interested in it.
It comes from [. . .], who refers to Ethiopia  
as the first... the argument of his dissertation is 
that Ethiopia is basically the first neocolonial  
concession in Africa. In terms of... In terms of 
the companies operating in the southwest.  
Well, I also think this is a
very interesting question that's  
particular to the Horn of Africa, because I'm also 
thinking about recent work on Egypt, right?
And the veiled protectorate and the sort of the 
central role that finance capital is playing  
in these forms of informal empire. And I think 
that's what you ended up saying, that  
the Italian case really does maybe present a more 
realistic view of empire in some ways, right?  
As it's speaking to these kind
of complex financial networks  
that actually do form empire in
these areas that are not I mean,  
yes, territorial colonialism is obviously an 
important dynamic on the continent of Africa. 
But even in those spaces, you have mining 
companies that have some form  
of sovereignty and actually provide a continuity 
between formal empire and neocolonialism. And  
so there is some dynamics that I think 
are particularly interesting in the Horn of  
Africa and in Ethiopia in particular, that 
really have a lot to teach us about  
thinking about empire more broadly.
Yeah, as I was preparing I  
just reread Philip Stern's The Company-State, and I 
thought that was perfect. Another book on the  
relationships and contracts, and I think
that was actually a really good... in India.  
And so I thought it was a very good 
example of how... So Philip Stern's book  
makes the argument that the early modern 
company is in essence a akin in its forms  
and in its rights to a kind of nation in 
that it possesses many of the same kind  
of qualities and powers as a sovereign power.
And in some sense, you can think in the early  
modern world about how companies were, in essence, 
rivals to nation states as a way of consolidating  
power. And I think if you particularly look 
at empires, you can kind of actually see this  
playing out far past the early modern world 
all the way up until as I've shown, 1930  
and perhaps even afterwards. Particularly if 
you look at the involvement of various  
companies in Ethiopian postwar period 
and in the Horn of Africa more broadly. 
So I thought that that was a really helpful way of 
also thinking about Prasso and it also confines to  
the kind of ways in which concessionaires, not so 
much Prasso, but usually his predecessor really  
exercised power. He had his own personal 
army, his predecessor, which he used and  
kind of became a big problem, obviously. 
And then actually they bring him back,  
they bring back this army around the 
time Prasso was there to govern. 
And he becomes the governor of the 
region, the guy who led the army,  
who's also not Ethiopian. He's Yemeni, I believe. 
He governs the province actually up until 1935.  
So there really is this interplay 
between capital and companies.  
And I think it's also important to think about 
companies not just in their liberal formation,  
but also how companies were 
construed in Africa by Africans,  
and that it's not necessarily a, you 
know, invention of European liberalism. 
Well, I mean, that's where the interesting 
comparisons that you're drawing between  
someone like Prasso and these Armenians 
and Greeks and traders who had... I mean,  
they have a much longer history in the region. 
I do wonder about this question of the  
continuity between liberal and fascist empire. 
It's out of my wheelhouse, to be honest. 
As you mentioned, that this is 
a big debate in Italian   
historiography. A dead debate. A dead
debate, sorry, the dead debate. But I do wonder  
it's not really a sort of part of this story, but 
about really the kind of ideologies of difference  
that, you know, have defined
colonialism in other historiographies.
And, you know, one of the things that stands 
out about Prasso is, I would call him, being  
sort of a Creole actor or, you know,
he lives a rather Creole life, at least. 
And I wonder whether there is 
with this sort of shift to more  
direct investment by the Italian state 
in the kind of latter stage that you  
identify. Is that accompanied by shifting 
ideologies of racial difference?  
I think it depends always on the who.
I can say that under Italian law at  
the time that Adolfo Prasso was registered as a 
citizen and up until the Italian invasion, under  
Italian law, Italo-Ethiopian children, just like 
Italo-Eritrean children and Italo-Somali children,  
were recognized as Italian citizens so 
long as their father recognized them. 
That didn't mean that it was done that often. 
And actually Prasso notes that when he did it,  
it wasn't often done. And it doesn't mean that 
it did not raise concerns within the Italian  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Actually, 
the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
constantly refers to Adolfo Prasso in kind of 
racially derogatory terms in their correspondence,  
even though by 19 Adolfo Prasso
winds up marrying a Belgian woman,  
and it looks like his father's very
upset about this marriage and they  
have a big falling out.
And after this period,  
Adolfo becomes the main informant of the Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the company  
and its actions and basically works on their 
behalf as a spy also in Western Ethiopia to kind of secure  
that Gasparini can take over this 
region. And he actually continues with that during  
the Italian occupation and invasion of Ethiopia.
He's one of the main informants and he's actually  
sent as a diplomat to negotiate the surrender of 
Western Ethiopia. So when the Italians invade,  
they basically get stopped at 1936 in Addis 
Ababa, but kind of in the historiography that's,  
you know, they declare the empire and the war 
is over. And in Europe, that's kind of it's  
all said and done.
Actually, that's  
a complete fiction that Mussolini somehow got in 
everybody's eyes. He barely occupied the country.  
They couldn't even get people to 
and from Asmara and Addis Ababa.
Particularly in Western Ethiopia, there's a 
provisional government that was established by  
Haile Selassie before he left for  
Geneva and then back. And there's  
the Western Oromo Confederation, which 
is led by a Oromo in Western Ethiopia,  
who bring a proposal to the League of Nations to 
themselves declared a British protectorate so that  
they will not be colonized by the Italians.
So Adolfo Prasso is actually sent to negotiate  
with both the Western Oromo Confederacy and the 
provisional government and to have this  
region surrender. And he ends up being killed 
by the Black Lions who are also in this region  
at the time. And this kind of is one of 
the main like massacres that the Italians  
like to talk about a lot and memorialized.
And he's only one of two Italo-Africans in the  
war who gets awarded a gold, he gets awarded a big 
important medal, and he actually gets memorialized  
publicly because his face is in the paper and 
everything, but that eventually disappears.  
But initially, he's kind of seen as this very 
important figure. So there's this weird...  
It's clear that they think about race
and they don't think about Alberto and  
or Adolfo as equivalent, but they also realize 
that Alberto Prasso is kind of like not the most,  
what they call, not the most
indigenized of the Italians in Ethiopia. 
They compare him to one of his business partners 
who dresses as an Ethiopian and lives there. And  
they think he's totally unacceptable. And they 
actually were considering replacing Prasso with  
this business partner. But they decided 
that process more European and therefore  
more acceptable, despite all of their problems 
with him. So race is clearly there, but I'm not  
sure whether it's necessarily more important 
than their strategic interests at this moment. 
And I think that's a really interesting 
way of thinking about how they're  
how they're willing to kind of manipulate 
that for their advantage in this period.  
I think that final comment just shows
the incredible richness of this biography  
that you've chosen, as Hollian was saying, as a 
method for understanding this period, imperialism,  
commercialism, the intersections, fascism.
I mean, it's an amazingly rich story out of which  
you've told us so much about the constellation 
of forces in this area at this time. I mean,  
it's really quite extraordinary. So, 
really, thank you for that wonderful  
insight and thank you, Hollian, for your 
extraordinarily penetrating questions. They were  
really great. That really helped to open it up.
So just a final word to our audience also.  
Thank you for participating and please 
continue to follow us on our website  
and on Facebook for future talks. So for 
now, thank you so much to both of you.