hello there

[Music]

everyone Steve Spiegel CED director here

uh and it's uh I am

delighted uh to

uh say hello to everyone from around the

world and thank you for joining us

today uh I'd like to take a moment to

thank our UCLA

co-sponsors uh International Institute

Department of political science luskan

department of public policy and the UN

sah nazarian

Center uh we thank them very much and

now let's move on before we begin please

note the following important

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suggestion to anyone who wants to ask a

question do it if you can as early as

possible because what we find in many of

these sessions that people wait till the

last 10 minutes and then everybody's

asking a question at the last minute and

you miss uh being able to do so uh

sometimes you have no choice but the

earlier uh the better now uh let's move

on to our phenomenal uh panel that we

have today uh Robert be is is a program

officer with the Israel Palestine

conflict program at the United States

Institute of Peace where he manages a

portfolio of policy research conflict

analysis and peace building projects I

have to say I call I let everybody

know you know I talk to them I talk to

everybody in a first name so when I get

the last name I sometimes mess it up so

I apologize if I do for my door is the

John Lewis peace fell at the United

States Institute of Peace and a board

member at the Middle East partnership

for peace act where she is responsible

for advising the US agency for

International Development on the

Strategic direction of the part of the

partnership for peace fund Dr Shar

hefron is the director of research at

the Israel policy forum and a special

climate change advisor to Israel's

Ministry of defense and National

Security Council uh Mr ibim Eid dalala

is a leading analyst of Palestinian

politics in the region the founder of

the Horizon Center and served for two

decades as a senior political adviser to

the US Counselor General in

Jerusalem uh

and last but certainly not least

Ambassador Karim hagad is a career

Egyptian Diplomat with over 25 years of

service in Egypt's diplomatic Corp he is

a professor of political of practice at

the school of global Affairs and public

policy director of the Middle East

studies Center at the American

University in Cairo and a non-resident

fellow at the elfer Center for Science

and international Affairs at Harvard

Kennedy School of uh uh government hope

I wasn't too quick but I'm anxious to

get to our program so let me uh turn

first uh to start the program for

uh

thank uh thank you Steve and uh thank

you everyone for joining uh what we will

try to do in the next um 80 or so

minutes is to explore the Dynamics

around uh post ceasefire order in the

Gaza Strip uh Our Hope For This

conversation is to take a

forward-looking approach um to have a

better understanding about what uh best

to Future outcome for Gaza would be uh

the actors who will play a role in

shaping that uh future and the tools at

their disposal to uh influence uh a new

Gaza of course in a process that um we

believe and we think uh should avoid um

temporary um Solutions becoming a

permanent fixtures

of course with the hope that um you know

Gaza postwar will be um better than

pre-war uh we are having this

conversation today during a time when

there is no uh widely agreed um or

comprehensive Vision or even a strategy

for Gaza uh we are yet to see what the

emergency International Conference which

will be held in Jordan this week will

bring to the table but I think we are

all in the same vote we are all this

conversation when uh the war didn't even

enter a phase that allowed for taking

steps towards renewal and Recovery

having said that uh we believe that

having uh this conversation right now is

extremely uh crucial uh we really need

to understand what need to be done

informed by our future forward U

thinking and we really need to

understand how the interest and

initiatives by different um uh Act s

could be best coordinated once the war

enters its next phase uh so to enrich

this discussion we are happy to have a

wonderful panel uh of experts uh and

before uh talking about post ceasefire

scenarios or the multiple uh Futures uh

let us start by uh understanding where

we are today uh I'm gonna uh start with

you Brahim uh if you could um describe

uh for us the um security and the

humanitarian situation in Gaza and uh

maybe give us your assessment about what

what are the pressing priorities for

this trip at this moment and maybe I'm

going to add um another layer for um for

this mix H if you could give us a peek

into the Palestinian Palestinian uh

conversation because I think it is

directly uh linked to all what is taking

place uh in gasa please preim

hello thank you thank

you thank youth for the

introduction um yes I um I would

actually have to say that in terms of uh

first the humanitarian situation in Gaza

and then actually move to the second

part of the second question about the

internal Palestinian politics and how

it's actually playing out specifically

in terms of postwar scenario in Gaza

first in terms of the humanit and

security situation in in in the Gaza

Strip right now I I think frankly it's

just suffice to look at uh independent

and reliable uh you know uh human rights

uh un and many other sort of like

sources and reports about uh the

Indescribable uh reality in the G St uh

having actually to also note that uh the

situation may have uh improved a little

bit in comparison to the first few weeks

and first few months of the war um but

uh it's still far from actually being

sufficient uh in terms of the actual

needs in fact uh yesterday the word

Health Organization representative had

uh quite blunt statements about the dire

need for food in certain parts of the

Gaza Strip um that includes Rafa which

has recently been invaded by the Israeli

Army uh in the north as well uh you know

with the closure of Rafa and the other

Crossings things have become um you know

uh more difficult uh the pier which was

built by the us but did not really serve

the uh the purpose in any efficient way

I think has also an impact um at the end

I think there's enough data to

substantiate the the reports about The

dire humanitarian situation in terms of

access and entry of humanitarian

supplies despite the best efforts um of

so many countries and international

organizations to actually alleviate and

improve that reality and it's obvious

that

without ceasefire cation of

hostilities this situation will continue

to be challenging uh suffering will

actually continue to be there and there

will be no enough sort of like amount of

Entry um of humanitarian and other basic

supplies into the gas strip under the

circumstances now in terms of the

internal security situation um you know

among many other uh factors um you know

anything that is identified with Hamas

and that actually includes um some sort

of uh you know like whether it's the

Civil police or the um or the you know

uh recently uh created Civil Society

type of committies and emergency

committies in Gaza which has Hamas

elements in it they're still being

targeted regardless of you know the the

identity uh of these um formations uh

which actually increases the problem of

inter internal uh um you know um

lawlessness um lack of security um law

and order it actually has a big impact

on uh looting anything that actually

comes into the Gaza Strip um especially

in certain parts where there's uh

obviously no central control uh anymore

um and that is a situation where I think

uh more and more um uh attention needs

to be paid uh to um you know the the

process of delivering uh those uh um you

know uh humanitarian needs to the Gaza

population now in terms of the uh second

part of the question Farah about the

internal Palestinian political Dynamics

um I think so far there is no uh one um

uh uh unified um position on the um you

know the post Gaza or the postwar uh

scenario in the Gaza trip and if I may

actually just say that you know we had

uh one meeting that was held in in

Moscow a few months ago there was a

meeting that was held in China and there

is another meeting that will be held on

the 23rd of June uh in um in China and

in fact there's a Chinese um high level

Chinese um delegation that is actually

visiting rala trying to basically get uh

perspectives and views of different

factions because the coming meeting is

going going to be for all factions not

only fat and Hamas and trying to unify

uh you know like positions in

preparation for that meeting but so far

I think the truth uh is uh or the

reality is that we don't really have a

unified position Hamas continues to have

its own conditions for um what it would

take uh for

anx in a post four scenario uh the PA

has its own PA fat has its own uh views

uh there is lots of support for um

National consensus government that would

be formed in consensus between Hamas fat

and the other factions uh but I think

that officially the the fat position is

that we cannot have um a government that

is condoned or has any uh connection to

Hamas uh in the post October 7 reality

uh whether that will change I doubt but

uh that's the current uh Dynamic so

although we have contacts that are being

held um you know there seems to be uh no

Clear Vision as to um you know like a

unified

Palestinian uh uh uh strategy towards

the uh post warar scenario and the um

you know the excuse or the way that it's

actually explained is that so long as

the war is Raging and there appears to

be no um uh sight uh for or near sight

or even medium term site for an end of

War war and end of hostilities in Gaza

uh the um the Moment of Truth does not

uh seem to have come to decision makers

whether it's you know like the fat you

know on part of fat and the PA

officially or on on on Hamas now the PA

has formed a technocratic government um

that has seven ministers from Gaza but

all of them basically for now sit in uh

in rala and without in my opinion uh

without a level of understanding uh even

a minimal level of understanding between

the different players uh whether it be

remains of Hamas Islamic Jihad and other

factions uh in order to actually get the

PA to uh uh to start operating in the

Gaza Strip in a postwar scenario the

situation will actually uh reflect

extremely negatively on uh internal uh

you know uh civil peace because you know

at the end of the day uh I think that

the PA is not in a good position to

impose uh control on the the gste

whether it's actually uh you know right

now or in the post uh uh War scenario

and I'm saying right now because an

example uh to uh to that uh is the fact

that the PA has not been able and did

not actually accept although reportedly

has been offered as a proposal to think

about and consider you know resuming

control of the Rafa Crossing uh without

having to be inside the Gaza Strip

physically uh or throughout the gist um

you know there are some elements that

work with the PA inside the gist STP but

those are like weak and there it's

segmented it's fragmented in certain

areas and does not really um give any

indication that the PA will be in a

position to have Central Authority and

central control over the entire G trip

and again as I said I think that would

require a Moment of Truth kind of

decision for them to uh to take and uh

it would require if this would actually

be um a process that would lead to

stability it would require a minimum

level of understanding with all the uh

you know the factions um and that even

though I know it sounds odd but that

would actually include remains of Hamas

and remains of Islamic Jihad and any

other faction in Gaza in order to have a

central control that would be respected

inclusive and uh um and effective I'm

not saying that you know there will be a

scenario for Hamas to actually be part

of that government I'm just saying that

there needs to be an understanding uh

that this government is not hostile to

all the other factions in in the gas STP

or the remains of those other factions

in the gas STP in any post tool scenario

one last comment that I would have

actually to mention is the um I think

one of the biggest problems that are

facing the PA in the West Bank right now

is the dire financial crisis and it's no

longer crying wolf I think that you know

uh the fact that the Israeli Finance

Minister has declared publicly that it's

time to actually topple the PA

economically has taken an effect uh no

uh tax revenues at all have been

transferred to the PA with a prior sort

of like decision taken by the fin the

Israeli Finance Minister and the PA has

been really facing very serious very

dire economic and financial uh situation

to the point that not only they're

unable to pay uh partial salaries but

they're not able to cover basic expenses

and this is about the West Bank so uh

that issue is also you know is an issue

that needs to be tackled before thinking

about restoring PA control over Gaza is

that they're losing the grip of control

over the the

West thank you thank you Ibrahim so uh

basically there is no unified um

Palestinian position Gaza is still

struggling uh to fill the governance uh

and security vacuum while of course

addressing the humanitarian need and

while all the eyes on Gaza um West Bank

and East Jerusalem um are are struggling

too uh I think this is the right segue

to move on to um Shira uh and Shir if

you could please um you know unpack uh

for us or explain to us how is the uh

Israeli uh political climate is actually

influencing um the security policies and

the humanitarian operation in Gaza and

if you could predict how this climate

going to uh impact uh future steps

especially when it comes to defining a

strategy for post ceasefire post um war

and any efforts for stabilization and

achieving security for Palestinians and

Israelis alike please

Shir um thank you far and do you all

hear me okay yeah okay uh it's good to

be here with so many friends I I don't

know if you want me to also address the

sort of the post SE fire um thinking now

just because there's so many so many

issues I I will respond to what uh

Ibrahim just said now maybe starting

with that I think on the humanitarian

front uh sadly uh Israel's policy really

evolved here and rather than um

understanding uh upfront right at the

beginning of the war that it's not just

uh uh really a moral imperative but it's

also a strategic choice that Israel has

to make and to ensure that there's

sufficient humanitarian relief in Gaza

this was something that Israel was U

sort of forced into King and screaming I

will say though that ironically now

Israel is trying to um push um the UN

and other players to bring in more

humanitarian supplies into Gaza so this

thinging has changed completely when you

speak about the politicians and the

political climate in Israel that's

everything you have sort of like the

defense establishment and you have most

of the country who's busy with other

things and we can talk about what's

happening domestically in in Israel but

it's

really Israel's at it weakest point you

know both regionally right and

security-wise but also domestically in

terms of people like just unable to

sustain their livelihoods uh so most

people don't care but you know you have

um an extreme a very extreme minority

that is over represented in the

government and so you know we hear about

those um um I think they should be

called by what they are you know there

vandalist they're trying to like burn uh

uh uh at TRS and trying to climb fences

and resettle in Gaza and obviously

they're representing the government by

the extreme right but this is a minority

and for for overall I think there's an

understanding in Israel the humanitarian

situation Gaza needs to improve however

there's also a realization that you know

this idea of lawlessness in in Gaza this

this concept there's no public security

because right we're just dismantling

Hamas Hamas is not entirely gone but it

keeps you know sort of siphoning off Aid

taxing Aid um and at the same time

you're creating these vacuums and of

course we see black market and all these

other phenomenons and also eight month

into this I mean we can't keep counting

how many how much flour there is for

Peter breads right like people have to

start getting more diverse uh Foods the

the health care supply it's it's people

are on displaced constantly um there are

some families that have been displaced

for six time so it's very difficult to

supply eight so I think we're all like

counting trucks and there's discrepancy

between the UN and Israel and we don't

have time to this we I can explain all

the discrepancy and I actually think

probably in terms of the numbers of

trucks that might be in the on the

border probably Israel has the more

accurate count but at the end of the day

it doesn't really matter if it doesn't

get to the people and and there's a real

issue and there's no question the

humanitarian situation continues to to

deteriorate and also the needs change in

terms of the current fighting um as

probably people here have follow there

was a big thing about whether Israel is

going to go to Rafa or not going to go

to Rafa and Biden posted sort of there

was the withholding of weapons uh and

then not withholding um and the idea is

at the moment uh the IDF is um operating

in the in Rafa it's mostly and I'm sure

kareim will get to this occupation of

the Philadelphia Corridor sort of the

strip that you know was on the border

between Gaza and and Egypt looking at uh

trying to stop uh smuggling tunnels um

and and and um and militants that are

there um there are reports that us

pressure here has indeed contained the

operation so it's still in the outskirts

of the city of Rafa but not inside the

city so you know it's not like a US veto

on the operation itself but but it it is

more contained than it was of course it

can it can grow um at the same time

there's still idea of fighting in other

parts U mostly in in jabal in the

Northern areas that at least to us

Israelis we've heard that you know have

occupied them from Hamas long time ago

and we have them clear so going in the

third uh time and often last week there

was more intense fighting in the north

than in the South

um the hostages obviously there's uh

there's still the Israeli hostages

there's a constant sort of debate you

know when we talk about the politics

there's there's a netan who's saying it

less he started saying it more in the

last few days but there's very extreme

right that keeps talking about a total

Victory um I don't know what they are

drinking smoking no total Victory uh in

sight most people uh understand um that

but it you know there there were two war

war aims right there's one dismantle of

M the dismantlement of Hamas as a

governing uh body that can threaten

Israeli militarily uh Israel militarily

and bringing back the hostages so far

hostages mostly are coming back uh dead

um

we uh five more were found dead or were

dis discovered that according to

intelligence U that they died four died

in captivity another one died um uh died

uh apparently was not a hostage uh but

those four hostages that died in

captivity uh the IDF sort of admitted it

without admitting it because there's an

investigation now into it but basically

IDF probably killed them by mistake

obviously but that's what happens when

you fight in those areas and this was

happened in hunis so we're in this

predicament now where where there's

there is a hostage deal ceasefire

whatever whatever you call it it um on

the table Biden spoke about it on Friday

he introduced it said it was an Israeli

position um it is an Israeli position

with

minor with minor modifications it's very

difficult to know uh what's going to

happen at the moment um everything

depends on the Prime Minister you have a

majority in the government that would

vote for um for a deal at least the

first stage of the deal and you can talk

about what a deal means but the first

stages you know we're talk about um 42

days six six weeks in which you know

women and and the wedad would would be

returned um and then later on other

other hostages it's a very difficult uh

deal to accept for Israel because

essentially Hamas is getting everything

they wanted um which is comes to

question why didn't we go for this deal

earlier when there were more people uh

to save but we don't know because

there's a majority in the government for

this deal but on the other hand uh uh

the def the Finance Minister who is also

a minister in the defense Ministry

Ibrahim mentioned him Bal smotrich and a

minister of Homeland Security benv

itamar Ben they're both true ideologues

and they said that if this deal is

accepted they're gonna withdraw from the

Coalition which means that they will

break the government and the assessment

has been so far that Nano places the the

the unity of his government basically

this the stability of his government

government ahead of the country's

interest on the other hand what can

change is that um there's a fear that

those lawsuits against is is Israel in

the ha right there's ICC and icj the

international court of justice and the

criminal court uh could turn into a

binding un security uh Council

resolutions and there's a real fear

around that sort there very different

considerations we hear from Nan on the

one hand that he accepts parts of the

deal on the other hand he keeps

reminding everyone that he's not going

to agree to a permanent ceasefire and

Israel will have the reserve the right

to continue fighting which is basically

begging Hamas to say hey hey no no our

precondition is no is this is a

permanent ceasefire so in a sense it's

really mixed messages and we don't know

I will just say that what we are in the

last couple of days speaking about more

in Israel and it's more than I know it's

not the topic but we can talk about Gaza

in

Silo the north of G of isra is on fire

literally um there's an escalation

that's becoming more and more dangerous

there are um I guess Hezbollah found the

sort of drone UAV weapons which is very

effective there are 10 wounded now in

the north I think civilians you know the

the idea there was there was a very

clear Like rules of the game how do we

operate right we only heard mil milit

military Targets on both side and within

a perimeter both sides keep push pushing

and pushing and pushing we're on this

escalatory path and on the one hand um a

seiz fire in Gaza is supposed to calm

everything down in the region right

Hassan asala sort of binded his uh

fighting in the north with the situation

in Gaza so in a sense this will uh calm

everything down on the other hand we are

hearing I'm hearing folks in the defense

uh establishment Israel saying oh if we

end in Gaza that would give us uh we

will be in a better position to attack

in the north because you know we need we

need um ammunitions we need we need the

soldiers uh we need we need we need

folks to fight H but then Israel would

lose legitimacy for a

preemptive war in Lebanon if everything

calms down uh so we have we have a real

H predicament there and the final thing

that I will say about the West Bank

stability and it does go into um you

know PA no PA if there's any other

alternative and I I don't know the there

is um there is an understanding in the

defense establishment that the PA is

really titering on the brink the fiscal

situation of the PA for a variety of

reasons uh stretch to the to the Bone uh

but also the economic situation in the

West Bank at large there's there are

objective reasons just you know slowdown

of economic activity there's the war

there's trade no laborers coming to work

in Israel what have you uh but of course

also the policy of of the the Finance

Minister who who was withholding um uh

Revenue taxes is withholding part of it

now is withholding more a part of the

withholding is due to other countries

recognizing the state of Palestine so

he's he's punishing

Palestine um now smotrich knows what he

wants and he you know he's pretty good

strategist right he says what he wants

and he's operating to get it but you

know there is a prime minister and there

is a cabinet and they are supposed to

know better and I think the question the

International Community should ask

Israel is you know this cabinet indeed

before October 7 but this cabinet in the

summer of 2023 decided proactively said

we have a government resolution to

ensure that the PA survives meaning to

prevent um uh the collapse of the PA and

there were steps taken and I think it's

time to ask Israel have you changed your

mind is this the policy of not smich of

the government of Israel because if it

is we're moving into a very very

different trajectory right it means what

is the future of not just Gaza and the

day after it's the day after the day

after this month and there is

legislation that is coming to effect

this month and there are ties between

Israeli Banks and Palestinian banks that

are going to be severed at the end of

the month um and this this is really the

money time for these questions um so

maybe I'll end with

this uh thank you thank you Shir this is

uh very heavy to digest but I think it's

a necessary sober take if you really

want to sketch what uh post um ceasefire

scenarios are we really need to

understand what is taking place at this

uh moment and maybe a theme that uh you

know came from your presentation and

rahim's that that we cannot deal with uh

Gaza in isolation from its surrounding

and that actually will be the right time

to bring uh Karim um to the discussion

um and and kareim there is a stressing a

question about uh the um Egyptian

Israeli uh bilateral relations and I was

wondering if you could explain to us how

the uh Israeli operations in in in Rafa

are actually stressing the capacities of

Egypt around um you know Gaza in terms

of border security humanitarian access

and even the the sense of cooperation on

so many files and next step in the

future

and if you could tell us about what are

Egypt's needs and priorities at this

moment and maybe constraints also please

Karim thank you Farah and thank you

Steve for the introduction and the

opportunity to participate uh in this

panel uh so Farah to your question

before we talk about Rafa I think we

have to underscore that uh for Egypt and

Gaza we are looking at a very broad set

of

circumstances uh beyond the Rafa issue

which I will get to uh that have real

implications for Egypt and uh by by

extension the Egyptian Israeli

relationship so from the beginning I

think the the uppermost issue of concern

for Egypt was uh the prospect of uh

Israel triggering uh the mass Force

displacement of Palestinians uh from

Gaza into Egypt this was a signal uh

that emerged uh that Egypt picked up

from uh Israeli statements during the

first week of the war as early as the

first week of the war repeated

statements that this was a deliberate

Israeli military objective to force the

mass displacement of Palestinians uh

into Egypt uh Egypt responded uh by

framing this issue as really a red line

for Egyptian security warning that it

would have implications not only for

Egypt's National Security but also the

stability of the Egyptian Israeli uh

relationship and then coupled with that

we had again from the very beginning an

Israeli deliberate policy of obstruction

of the flow of humanitarian Aid through

the RAF border crossing which was the

main conduit for humanitarian relief uh

going into daza as I think Shir

mentioned quite correctly that this uh

gradually emerged as being what was

perceived to be a very deliberate

Israeli policy of exacerbating the

humanitarian situation in Gaza in a way

that would uh have as one of its effects

uh the uh uh forc displacement of of

Palestinians from Gaza uh into Egypt so

this posed a tremendous logistical

burden uh on the operations uh along the

Rafa border crossing but it also had

strategic implications uh for uh Egypt

and the these issues were really seen

from the perspective of Cairo as falling

against the backdrop of what was a very

longstanding history

of Israeli attempts to solve the problem

of Gaza in Egypt right whether through

uh previous proposals to uh get an

agreement to enlarge the area of Gaza uh

into the Sinai through land swaps

between Egypt and Israel between the

Sinai and the negtive or pressuring

Egypt to assume responsibility for

governance and security uh in Gaza or

forcing the mass influx of Palestinians

uh into Egypt so from the beginning this

war had real serious strategic

implications uh for Egypt and tied to

the overall stability of the

relationship between uh Egypt uh and

Israel then we get to uh Israel's latest

uh occupation of the Philadelphia

Corridor and of course uh the Rafa order

Crossing and there are several very

significant implications here so first

there there is a very direct implication

linked to the Egyptian Israeli peace

treaty so the Philadelphia Corridor

which runs along the entire length of

the Egypt Gaza border is part of area D

and area D is meant to be a

demilitarized zone uh on the Israeli

side uh of the border the fact that we

now have Israeli forces with the IDF

deployed in the Philadelphia Corridor

constitutes a violation of the security

adets of the Egyptian Israeli uh peace

treaty we also have a situation in which

Egyptian and Israeli forces are now

deployed in very close proximity across

each other uh facing each other uh along

the Philadelphia Corridor and facing

each other across the Rafa border

crossing and that has has the potential

very serious potential of leading to

frost B fire incidents as exactly what

happened uh last week with the exchange

of fire between Egyptian and Israeli

forces uh leading to a number of

casualties on uh the Egyptian side so so

we have the prospect of a repeat uh of

these types uh of

incidents and then of course it it

presents Egypt with a very

serious dilemma of how to operate the

border crossing with Israel effectively

a reoccupying Palestinian territory with

its control of Philadelphia and the Rafa

border crossing so from the beginning

Egypt's interest was to maximize the

flow of humanitarian assistance going

into Gaza principally through the Rapa

border crossing but in any way that we

can get

humanitarian assistance uh into the Gaza

Strip whether through the the various

crossings that Israel controls

between Israeli territory and Gaza

whether through air drops so e Egypt

actually participated actively with

dozens of airdrops of humanitarian

supplies into Gaza but now with Israel

effectively occupying the Rafa border

crossing this presents a dilemma between

Egypt's desire to maximize the flow of

humanitarian Assistance or basically to

Aces to Israel's occupation or

reoccupation of Palestinian territory so

this is a very serious uh issue for

Egypt and this has prompted a very firm

Egyptian position that insists on Israel

relinquishing control of the Rafa border

crossing in order to allow for the

efficient and full resumption of

operations uh humanitarian operations uh

Rafa and finally I think that there's a

there's a very uh

important implication of the emerging

strategic uh situation that we have in

Gaza and this gets to a little bit of

what ibraim what was describing in his

presentation so now what we have in Gaza

is a reality of a potential vacuum of

governance uh in Gaza we have a

breakdown of security coupled with a

complete humanitarian and social

breakdown of the situation uh in Gaza

and so we may have a situation in which

we don't actually get to a day after

scenario in in Gaza meaning a day after

where we can actually begin to talk

about sustained humanitarian Rel belief

or we can begin to talk about serious

reconstruction we can begin to talk

about a reestablishment of governance uh

in Gaza and that has real serious

implications uh for Egypt so we hear a

lot about uh this phrase now that's

constantly being referenced with regards

to Gaza as a Somalia on the

mediterrania and one very serious

analyst of conflict uh in the region

told me you know Kim we may actually be

faced with a different scenario of a fua

on the Mediterranean so a long-term

decades long

Insurgency uh that will continue between

armed factions including Hamas in Gaza

and uh the IDF even if we do get some

form of tentative ceasefire uh in

Gaza that situation has real spillover

effects in to Egypt it has spillover

effects that could potentially

destabilize Northern sin so we may have

a return of terrorism operations in the

Sinai the return of of extremism

trafficking in illicit Goods in weapons

and

smuggling and that will have real

implications for the stability of the

Egyptian Israeli

relationship and it's it's a situation

that will not only complicate the

overall relationship the security

relationship between both sides but it

puts a tremendous pressure on uh Egypt

and Israel to deal with what will be a

very complex and very highly

destabilizing situation and it may just

present a reality that is beyond the

ability of both sides to actually manage

and I think the important point to

underscore here is the danger that this

is not or may not be a temporary

situation this is the situation that we

will have over the long term and unless

we move very quickly and very seriously

to stabilize that emerging reality uh I

think the the implications for Egypt and

the Egyptian Israeli relationship uh

could potentially be quite serious so so

so maybe that gets to the second part of

your question about Egypt's approach as

to how to address uh this very troubling

potential reality that we see emerging

uh before us uh in

Gaza so I think clearly the we've all

followed uh the uh Egypt's tents as part

of the ceasefire negotiations uh

underway we need a stable ceasefire uh

in Gaza hopefully one that will come

with guarantees by the parties involved

the United States Egypt and K hopefully

one that will be coupled with some form

of monitoring mechanism uh to actually

hold the parties to account as to who uh

will violate the ceasefire but beyond

the ceasefire we need to think very

quickly about how we put Arrangements in

place that will stabilize Gaza that will

actually lead to the resettlement of

internal displaced persons uh in Gaza

and that will get to a situation of

sustained humanitarian relief and

hopefully reconstruction in Gaza the key

Point here and this is this is where um

uh I think I'll make a final observation

all of this has to be coupled with a

serious Pathway to a political process

that gets us to a two-state solution I

think the The Dilemma we all have here

and especially on the Israeli side and

Shir hinted at this is is that we are

all looking at a an alternative to

hamas's rule in Gaza an alternative that

is legitimate that has a sense of

political legitimacy that is not a

problem that lends itself to a military

solution there can only be a political

solution to that problem and if we're

talking about legitimacy that has to be

coupled with a pathway back to a

political process leading to two states

in that context all of the arrangements

that we're talking about with regards to

reestablishing Palestinian governance in

Gaza revitalizing or reforming the PA to

retake control of Gaza putting in place

credible security Arrangements in Gaza

and even in in the West Bank all of

these things can actually be

contemplated they become realistic when

we do have a serious political process

that gets us back to two states in the

absence of that I think all of the

problems that we are now uh seeing

emerging uh in Gaza will only be

exasperated and they will have real

consequences for Egypt uh but also

Israel and the relationship the Egyptian

Israeli relationship as a um thank you

uh what I'm hear you saying that Gaza

definitely has uh the power uh to shape

the bilateral relations between Egypt

and uh Israel and it has the ability to

redefine what the Egyptians national

interests are which means that we are

entering and charting in new uh

territories uh let me bring Robert to

the conversation right now um Robert you

have the very easy task of explaining to

us uh how is the rising tensions between

um Israel and the United States is

impacting uh the American approach

towards Gaza please thank you Farah and

uh thank you to CED and and all my

colleagues here um I'll do my best to be

quick so that we can get to both

audience questions and questions to dive

deeper on the sort of recovery and

renewal uh pieces of this and to speak

to your question F about where we are

today uh in the bilateral relationship

in the Biden administration's approach

to Gaza um I think it's pretty clear

that the Biden Administration is eager

move on from uh from where we are today

into the next phase if if that's

possible uh not for a lack of support

for for Israel's right of self-defense

as they keep saying but uh as they would

frame it a way to avoid uh further uh

disaster potential Quagmire a potential

escalation of of other threats um I

think as I would agree with Kareem

completely something that's talked about

around Washington uh a lot right now is

that there may not be a um a day after

or this could be the day after that

there's not a light switch on and off

from uh War to post-war uh that this

will be a a process but the bid

Administration is very eager to move

from uh where we are today into into a

future phase that offers some potential

for different momentum um towards

something that's better than where we

are today so there's been of course uh

humanitarian disaster hostages for held

for nine months uh but Hamas is

seriously degraded is the is the sense

uh the bid Administration has that there

is not a chance that Hamas can can

commit another October 7th uh and that

now is the time to uh look towards a new

phase uh and then it it goes without

saying that this is a complex and mostly

negative issue um in us uh domestic

politics and foreign policy um so the

Biden Administration is committed to uh

through the current negotiations trying

to move toward uh avoiding uh into a new

phase which avoids or tries to head off

the kind of nightmare scenario that

kareim just mentioned um so they're

heavily invested in these current talks

uh there's that means a a pause in

fighting some kind of Hostage exchange a

humanitarian relief um and as Ibrahim as

well mentioned they feel that a

ceasefire is the step that opens the

door to all next steps even if it's uh

you only get phase one of a three-phase

system they feel that changing the the

chemistry of the conflict right now uh

is a good uh in and of itself uh there's

a need for it and they see real urgency

in moving to the next phase and creating

momentum uh and then it adds to a

broader picture that the bid

Administration is very committed to um a

vision for a new Middle East that's

talked about a lot uh you call it the

Biden Doctrine however you you phrase it

uh that is Israeli Saudi normalization

us uh security commitments to Saudi

Arabia um but that comes with a road map

or some other term um toward a real uh

two-state solution towards a Palestinian

State um and then of course the larger

security alliances and and architecture

that go along with that um so the Biden

Administration is is very much looking

to move toward uh an ingame which

advances this sort of um Regional

security architecture Israeli and

Regional um uh relations in a different

place and Palestinian self-determination

uh but where they're kind of to your

point uh far in the point of the

question uh where they're struggling is

is a sense of strategy a sense of iname

from the Israeli side from Israeli

leadership uh what is the what is the

ultimate set of goals um that that the

Israelis would like to uh take away from

Gaza um uh postwar and what what comes

next uh is the question that keeps being

being asked um and the bid

Administration has a real um uh

challenge in terms of uh convincing

Israelis and Palestinians that they have

a partner in making this the last war

and moving towards um the sort of

political uh solution that is necessary

as I think Kareem mentioned uh we have

solutions for U rebuilding their

Technical Solutions to all these issues

the issue is politics and the issue is

uh policy and so uh building that sort

of trust and Leadership uh is one of the

main challenges the bid Administration

is facing

um and all of those will play into uh

these next steps around uh recovery

renewal what is what is gaz's next steps

orchestrating uh moving into the post a

post ceasefire world and orchestrating

who doing what when where why and how uh

is very much the role um that the Biden

Administration expects to uh be trying

to play there's nothing that's going to

happen without partners and so that's I

think the the next uh half hour or so uh

what we'd like to dive into is uh some

of these questions about the capacities

of the different actors around uh around

the the conflict and what's going to be

necessary by whom so uh with that uh I

think we had planned uh to to for for

far to to weigh in um far do you want to

speak just for maybe a couple of minutes

to the uh Jordanian um views and

priorities around Gaza and how

uh that plays into this uh well very

quickly because we W to leave time for

for the question I um questions um I

think since October 7th um um Jordan has

been navigating a very complex and um um

challenging landscape uh in responding

to these challenges Jordan adopted um a

very assertive diplomatic uh uh approach

um and and basically during the first

weeks of the

um you know the war um the priorities

were uh that these uh diplomatic efforts

need to focus on ending the war um um

calling for um an immediate ceasefire

and providing uh humanitarian uh relief

for the Gaza and during the first uh

weeks you know um the main priority for

Jordan and this is something kareim

talked about is to affirm its opposition

to any uh population transfer uh

immediately after the outbreak of the

war King Abdullah stated that any

Palestinian transfer whether from Gaz to

Egypt or from the West Bank to Jordan is

considered a red line uh prime minister

bisher reiterated this position and said

that uh such scenario will be uh the

equivalent of a de declaration of war uh

in Jordan on Jordan and um basically

during these uh weeks uh there has been

um um a strong collaboration U between

uh Jordan and Egypt in order to

coordinate their um you know positions

and form a United uh front against uh

this scenario meanwhile uh Jordan played

a significant role in uh organizing and

providing humanitarian Aid uh for the

Gaza Strip it succeeded in um

positioning itself as a regional uh

coordination Hub uh for Aid and we are

having uh members of the RO royal family

even contributing to these initiatives

and that's singling the immediate um and

the level of commitment uh to that uh

cause and in continuation for that uh

Jordan is set to have um emergency

International Conference uh in the Dead

Sea on June uh 11th uh this conference

is organized by Jordan Egypt and uh the

United Nations and will bring a wide

variety of actors from the public

private sector and even the NGO uh world

world uh with the um I would say the

purpose to address operational and

logistical needs and push for a

collective coordinated response um in

Gaza uh what the conference will bring

to the table we're yet to see that uh we

will yet to see whether uh this

conference will succeed in uh Bridging

the gaps in positions that were

identified in a previous Gatherings

especially during Manama conference um

but again it's it's too yet um it's too

uh soon to um um you know assess the

success the level of success of this uh

conference and moving to other

priorities that Jordan um you know is

focusing on um beside Gaza um and this

is something that Rahim you know talked

about is the situation in the West Bank

and East Jerusalem and the rising uh

tension and the settlers attack and the

provocations

of and how that adds a yet another layer

of complexity not only to the Jordanian

not only to the Palestinian Israeli file

but also to other Regional files that

Jordan deals with on the Northern and

Eastern uh border and high tension um

there so uh I would say Robert to your

question the priorities of Jordan since

the beginning of the war till now uh was

to ending the war calling for immediate

ceasefire and of course providing an uh

emergency uh relief uh for the STP and

working to stabilizing the West Bank and

East Jerusalem all doing that as you

know kareim U you know pointed to within

uh with the hope that there will be a

diplomatic process that will include um

irreversible measures towards uh the

two-state solution so um I think with

that uh we are ready to move on to the

next uh phase of um of our questions

about the post um um ceasefire scenarios

and the multiple future for for Gaza

Roberts thank you far so in the next

phase of this uh this conversation what

we're going to try to do is weave

together questions around uh post-war

Gaza what the process steps actors would

be uh and weave to weave in um those

with our with our audience questions

which of which there are many and I

apologize if we can't get to all of them

so uh first to Shir um what would you

speak to where the Israeli government

and Israeli Society is is around what

success for Gaza looks like in the next

1 three five years again it's a huge

question very difficult but what is the

ultimate uh sense of goals and endgame

for Israel what are the Partnerships

that are necessary for that and to speak

to a question that came in from the

audience is uh where would you say uh

the conversations in Israel are around

uh the risks that the current trajectory

has about Israel's International

relationships it's it's of place in the

International Community is there a I

think it goes back and forth sense of uh

both isolation and or acceptance and

support from the International Community

so again that's very those are three

very long questions uh but as best you

can can you speak to what does success

for Gaza look like uh directly and and

more broadly yeah listen there's the

over there's the the majority I think

population um who are mostly consuming

is Israeli News um and the media here

enact self-censorship so Israelis don't

see what everyone else sees in the world

not on the damage in Gaza um and not

other images it's everything through a

very self-centered lens of what's

happening to us and something horrible

happened to us I mean there's no

question right something horrible that

appended all of Israelis thinking about

what be being secure means so but

without without uh looking at that um I

think there's there's that and there's

the more like you know experts what

experts thing and those are not the same

things and the expert level

conversations and and this clear sort of

uh choice between the current trajectory

which in my view but not just in my view

uh could cannot bring us anything

positive you know in Hebrew it sounds

better but nothing good is threatening

us if we continue on the current

trajectory versus the other option that

has risks for sure uh but uh but could

save Israel from the PRI status

internationally from having to own Gaza

from having to uh manage the civilian

Affairs of of Palestinians right we talk

about 3 millions in the the West Bank

and 2.3 million in Gaza I mean there's

no capacity to do this Regional war and

and what have you so I I don't think

this conversation is um is made clear to

Israelis as others may be outside uh

think I also think that even a

conversation that is much more you know

narrow what would a war with hasbalah

actually look like you know and and this

would be terrible the scenar is we have

our thousands of of casualties in Israel

and buildings falling and infrastructure

and taking Israel decades backwards and

even this is not discussed so what

Israeli you know when we want to talk

about the public and when we talk about

decision makers and want to talk about

the defense establishment and it really

depends what you ask in different

Israelis I think the fact is what a

success in Gaza looks like no one

defined it it was sort of like oh we

want to uh dismantle Hamas whatever that

means and bring back the hostages

um the hostages have not returned so so

it's very difficult you know there's a

clear metric here are we returning the

hostages and if this is success and what

does this amandement of Hamas um means

when Michael kopo and myself we wrote a

sort of like a plan for the day after

which I I I want to go into too length

because don't have time but what I think

is the only path path forward and some

people do agree with you me but they

don't say it and I I'll explain why um

we said that the failure to plan ahead

will bring Israel to one of two

scenarios one would be a Hamas

Resurgence and the other would be

Israeli occupation I never thought in

the world you could have both at the

same time and that's in fact what's

happening now we have Israeli occupation

in one parts of Gaza and we have Hamas

Resurgence in another so this we we're

having sort of a very negative scenario

and and I think what we're seeing

gradually is more and more Israelis

saying well we do have to discuss the

day after because we're not we're not in

a good place what they are saying and if

you've heard Minister Gans who is n's

Prime Contender and also defense

minister galand who is from nal's party

both said the same thing they're like oh

we have to find a day after and they're

uh what they're calling for is there I

want to read this and there's three

threats and other things that never mind

w't get into but it's like we have to

create a governing body to look at Gaza

and the US will oversee it um and with

the Europeans and the Arabs and this

goes to what Farah spoke about and and

Karim right the jordanians will come

with their troops on the ground and the

Egyptians everyone will secure it and

unspecified local

Palestinians and this is where I think

we we we are you know I think the

Israeli public they they've come to sort

of see the PA or the PA and Hamas is the

same Palestinians all are being uh the

same and it's not just injustice it's

just also really wrong because they are

no unspecified Palestinians there are no

unicorns and gites essentially a

two-party system right there's there's

Hamas and there is the the the the the

fat which dominates the PA they're not

that really in between so for a good

reason you can find any so I think when

when I look at what's a way out of this

stalemate is yes having a

provisional um Administration in Gaza

which would be uh you can tell local pal

but it has to be under the offices of

the PA no one means that Abu maen who

can't control Janine and nublas and I'm

sure ibraim has a lot of things to say

about you know

the how how the PA is governing and

their capacity they have no capacity at

the moment they're not going to roll

into Gaza and take over but but it has

to be part of sort of like a PA umbrella

to get all the benefits of the

International Community uh the Arab some

sort of legitimate political pathway

toward a separation of a state one day

and then I think maybe there's a chance

of getting an Arab support and we could

say what the support looks like um and

support by the International Community

for restoring basic Services right some

sort of public security which will have

to happen moving from the Urgent

humanitarian needs to some sort of

recovery I mean kids would have to go to

school at one point in Gaza so this is

not just like we're talking about food

food food there's there's Beyond food

when you talk about humanitarian but

essentially recovery and and beginning

the very long and very very very

expensive trajectory of of

reconstruction the World Bank uh

estimates it could cost $40 billion and

take many years how do we even start

about this I just don't see um um any

any of the any of that could happen

without recognizing inside Israel that

um it's not maybe the optimal choice but

we don't have uh a choice where we are

you know in the neighborhood in terms of

the and the PA is in fact or PA and a or

body is affiliated with the PA our our

best choice at the moment to to um get

us out of this plan so I think where

maybe I I'll sum up with this that I

think that in Israeli press and Israeli

politicians are portraying the PA as as

part of the problem and I think that

they the framing should change to the PA

is being part of the solution they need

to do a lot of work reforms is an

understatement of what they need to do

um there's a lot that that's hanging on

them the International Community has

leverage the Arabs have leverage but I

just don't see um us getting out of this

moror us without without

it thank you Shar uh so our next uh

panel is going to be ibraim and Ibrahim

I want to pick up on the end of shir's

inject um around particularly the role

of the PA so so broad picture being what

are the pillars of uh the future of

Palestinian the Palestinian national

project in terms of where Palestinian

public opinion is um how do you build

consensus around this Vision there are a

lot of different ways to look at it and

then uh finally there is this tension

between the different models that have

been been put out there which is uh the

PA as as an essential actor and the PA

as un ready not quite ready to um be an

actor a major actor in uh in Gaza

particularly with with uh it's unclear

what hamas's future is so then there's

the question of uh a temporary Force um

multinational Force transitional force

that could be absorbed by the pa uh how

can you speak to those two big questions

which is what what are the principles

the pillars about the future of the

Palestinian national project and then

what are the institutions and processes

for advancing this if this is an

opportunity um what does that look like

and again uh very big questions um post

to you uh to speak very

quickly uh speaking very quickly I was

actually warned or asked to slow down so

I want to be speaking quickly I will try

to actually slow down so I'm um

so people uh basically um um fully uh uh

understand what I say uh first of all I

think uh to be honest you know that

these are the in my opinion and I think

in in general Palestinian public opinion

the very wrong questions um as it stands

today uh with a government of ideologues

in Israel or at least as Shir was

mentioning U ideologues that are given

power in in determining policies whether

it's Visa Gaza

or Hamas or you know the Palestinian

Authority I don't really think that

there are prospects for the PA to reform

in fact I would actually Warn and um say

that if the current situation the

financial situation of the Palestinian

Authority stays like it is and it looks

like it's going to stay like it is for a

month or two I think you'll start seeing

the

disintegration uh of the PA in the West

Bank even further disintegration yes you

know the PA requires and needs lots of

reps but the external pressure that is

being applied by the uh Israeli Minister

of Finance who publicly stated that it's

time to bring down the PA economically

is not something that you would actually

neglect if you were living in the West

Bank as an average cism because you see

it you see that 40% by the way of

Palestinian employees are unable to

reach their workplaces not only because

of the internal cles that have been

applied since October 7 but now actually

because they have no means and no

finances and no salaries to actually get

to their workplaces um you know like p

security forces are being you know

cutting down on supplies to them that

includes food uh so instead of like

three meals they're actually getting two

meals uh and you know it's actually you

know um uh going worse and worse private

sector you know the currency flow the

fact that you know like more than

reach their workplaces while public

sector is not being paid and this has

been going on for for more than eight

months uh or being paid partially um

this has created a situation where the

pa has entered into a state of

disintegration so thinking about the PA

role in Gaza while it's unable to

sustain its control in the West Bank is

really absurd and in so many you know

different ways and you have an Israeli

Minister who basically controls policy

and says that it's time to actually

bring down the PA so that's not

conspiracy theory this is basically a

reality that we're going through and

we're seeing the end the out um on the

uh on the other sort of like um part of

the of the question is that I think

frankly a corner store of analysis and

real politic dictates the following if

the current Israel government stays in

place I don't really think that there

are prospects for a day after in Gaza

and I agree with the you know with the

scenario that was presented by uh by

Karim earlier that A Wasteland you know

call it fuja call it Somalia a wasteland

sort of like reality in Gaza is the most

likely for for the coming years with

dire humanitarian situation lawlessness

and you know um any attempt to impose

any of the I think four scenarios that

are play out there uh will work will not

work and it will going and it's going to

actually be a different uh level of war

and Insurgency in so many different

levels and the four scenarios by the way

that are being talked about

intellectually at least theoretically

because in the absence of concrete

Israeli plan to make it work nothing is

going to happen that way um one is

actually that talks about some you know

like Think Tank centers that talk about

you know multinational force and a

commission of politicians coming to Gaza

which is a mandate a for mandate that

would be imposed on Gaza and I can

assure you that this comes uh without

consent of you know Palestinians whether

it's the PA or Hamas or remains of Hamas

is going to be resisted and it won't

work and I'm not sure which countries

whether Arab or foreign countries would

want to replace IDF Rule and occupation

of Gaza uh in order to serve certain

interests which are not and don't look

like a Palestinian you know short of uh

political solution that will never

actually come about in the presence of

such an Israeli government uh second

scenario is actually resurrection of PA

Authority control in Gaza we all know

and again you know with the Israeli the

current Israeli policy of basically

tpping down the PA economy there is no

you know scenario as such that PA would

be able to go and operate in Gaza third

scenario that people talk about is the

full occupation and civil administration

at least some people in Israel are

talking about uh and those some people

include ministers by the way uh this is

like a full occupation of civil

Administration which takes us back to

you know the 70s and 80s which is a

continued uh you know struggle against

that occupation and a such you know it's

closer to the westand scenario than

anything else

um and the fourth scenario uh is um

where you have uh um you know an

agreement between factions remains of

factions to bring back a Palestinian

Authority a different form of a

Palestinian Authority similar to a

Palestinian Authority Quai Palestinian

Authority technocratic government that

requires internal Palestinian

understanding and it can't be imposed uh

and so long as there are dictates and

there are like conditions uh on forming

that kind of authority including by

Israel which Again by the way has

rejected even the return of PA to the to

the RAF Crossing just recently uh so you

know that that that does not really uh

tell you much about the prospects of any

of those Solutions uh becoming

actionable um you know in terms of the

two State solution that Kim wased to

which I agree with fully uh you know I

think that the last thing that is being

debated not secretly but quietly uh on a

US paper that has been presented to the

contact uh group the six Arab group and

has not yet seen light but it will uh

you know maybe uh that you know the US

Administration is committed to resuming

negotiations on two-state solution and

normalization with Saudi Arabia well

that's great uh but you know with a with

the with the again going back to the

Corner Stone with the current Israeli

government in place I I don't really

think that there will be final status

negotiations on Palestinian statehood

whether it be Gaza or the West Bank and

let's not talk about is Jerusalem so you

know I think that all those scenarios

that we have uh out there are not yet

actionable and the Cornerstone is and

I'm not you know acquitting the palestin

authority of Need for institutional

reform I'm not acquitting Hamas and

blaming it for for the current crisis

that we are in but at the end of the day

moving forward would require uh

different Israeli government in place

and then you can talk about prospects of

resuming negotiations and you know

bringing back

um you know the Palestinian Authority uh

to Gaza for that to become an actionable

uh uh plan uh one last thing that I

would actually like to um just highlight

U you know the the fact that you know

people talk about whatever it means in

terms of Hamas and and and how do you

actually get the Israeli um War goals

implemented or or materialized you know

H the truth I think is that Hamas is

three things in Gaza and only one body

you have like one Hamas that has to do

with the governance in Gaza a government

in Gaza and Hamas has stated publicly

that they will agree to the forming of a

technocratic government with a certain

conditions that they have and that's I

think a possibility to ending up with a

qupa technocratic government that could

take over you know control in Gaza

because Hamas under the current

situation in the post-war scenario is

unable to meet the the enormous needs

and requirements of governing Gaza

directly the same way that they actually

did before uh the second you know level

of Hamas is the military wing and that I

think you know with all the devastation

that has happened to the military wing

and the you know the infrastructure in

Gaza I think that their ability to

launch a massive attack like October 7

which incidentally not only because of

hamas's superiority in terms of military

uh and security and terrorist

capabilities but also because of the

failure of the Israeli system so if you

actually take those two points together

you know definitely Hamas is not going

military Wing is not going to be in a

place or in a position to launch an

attack against Israel like October 7 and

you know the third you know level is the

Hamas polit you know as a political

organization and by the way the the

popular base of Hamas in the Gaza Strip

in fact and in the West Bank and also in

other you know countries where

Palestinians are there has been growing

uh because of the uh because of the war

the brutality the way that civilians

have been killed and the way that it's

perceived by Palestinian public and

therefore you know like Hamas is a

political organization I think you know

you can move it to the side corner it

but you can't totally eliminate it

whereas you know the other two elements

or bodies or structures of Hamas as a

government and uh um as a military Wing

can actually be treated with and dealt

with in light of the of the war and its

outcome in short in order to actually

get to a situation where you can

actually move into an actionable plan

and a scenario you simply need sensible

not an ideolog driven Israeli government

that helps the Palestinian Authority to

actually Take Over Control in Gaza helps

the Palestinian Authority to basically

you know create a formation of

governance in Gaza whether it be

civilian or Security in order to um you

know like push Hamas aside and and move

forward from that point but you know in

a situation where it's no Hamas and no

and no Palestinian Authority and we

would like to have some you know

favorable Palestinians that we would

like to work with under a civil

Administration and the direct military

rule it's going back to the 70s and 80s

and the you know starting the struggle

in so many different ways uh you know a

new and with that I think I would um I

would finish and if you have any uh

questions or comments I I would be more

than happy to answer thank youim and and

so I'm going to Pivot to Kareem then

we'll take a couple more audience

questions and wrap but uh Ambassador he

geg um so there is the uh it's it's very

clear that Egypt is a critical actor for

all of gaza's next steps uh Ibrahim laid

out four potential scenarios for what

the security situation how it would be

handled in Gaza going forward a

multinational force uh is difficult or

impossible pa uh ownership which is uh

maybe not feasible uh Israeli control

which is very possible but uh

potentially uh the recipe for long-term

Insurgency um trouble um and then some

kind of Quasi Palestinian Authority that

that Ibrahim laid out there um I wanted

to get your one reactions to those

different um possibilities and and what

the Egyptian vision for response of that

would be uh two as someone that's

thought about uh Regional security for

so long um what is the sense of a uh the

feasibility of a multinational Force

taking uh taking uh some kind of

temporary mandate uh to to run Gaza

until it could be handed over to um

Palestinians to run what would be

Egypt's requirements for doing so its

capacity to do so and how does it relate

to uh the Egyptian relationship to

Israel and the United States uh and then

finally there were a couple of questions

in the chat about uh Egyptian commitment

to preventing smuggling uh in the

postwar uh era so has there been a any

kind of change in um egyp the security

apparatus is thinking uh about how

smuggling is addressed and again

apologies that I'm I'm giving you a lot

of big questions for only a few minutes

but over to you

Kareem uh thank you Robert uh I will be

very brief so I completely concur with

what ibraim uh mentioned about the

difficulty of uh each of these options

uh to add to the challenge and the

difficulty I would actually Advocate

that we need to do uh all or most of

these options together so let let's

think of this as a series of problems uh

that need uh

Solutions let's try and distinguish

between these problems to deal with the

problem of governance and Security

postwar in Gaza uh there really seems

very little alternative to some form of

international for force uh in Gaza now I

I completely agree about the hesitance

and reluctancy of Most states to

participate uh in this Force which is

why we need to begin to think seriously

about the Mandate for this Force I do

not foresee a mandate in the form of a

un Security Council resolution uh

establishing this Force setting out the

parameters of this Force without it

being linked uh specifically explicitly

to the references for two states right

so we we would have to get a force with

a with a mandate linked to the

principles of land for peace two-state

solution possibly the 67 borders uh

Jerusalem as the capital of two states

uh uh Etc that is the only way we we

will probably get International

consensus on the establish of this type

of force to deal with the Palestinian

legitimacy issue yes I I think that the

PA is in no way shape or form ready to

assume governance in Gaza that is why I

think ideally we would have to have the

establishment of this uh International

Force coupled with some form of symbolic

Palestinian presence in the form of a uh

consensus government for the West Bank

and Gaza uh that would lend legitimacy

to this

arrangement to deal with the Hamas

problem so I I think it's becoming

evidently clear that there is no

military solution to the Hamas problem

the only potential solution is a

political one now that can take many

forms that can take the form of some

form of reconciliation agreement between

fat and Hamas as Egypt has strived to do

for decades now ever since hamas's take

over of Gaza in 2007 or it could take

the form of basic understandings between

the PA and hamz as I think ibraim

mentioned quite correctly so that hamz

does not be a

spoiler the the key Point here is that

all of these problems are linked and the

only way these Solutions become actually

operable right I'm not saying easy but

operable and conceivable is within the

context of a serious road map back to

two states once you do have that it

becomes conceivable to actually think of

an international Force to think of

Palestinian reconciliation to think of a

return of the PA back to Gaza final

point I will make yes these are all very

difficult Solutions but if you think

these are difficults I would ask you to

pause and reflect on what Shir mentioned

so I think she got it absolutely right

we may have we may end up with the worst

of all worlds in Gaza with the

reestablishment of Israeli military

occupation in Gaza with Hamas still very

much a presence in Gaza a continuation

of the armed conflict between Hanes and

Israel probably uh involving other

Palestinian factions we will have a

serious humanitarian problem in Gaza we

will have a wasteland situation as

ibraim mentioned so if all of these uh

potential Solutions look difficult I

would seriously suggest that we look at

the alternative and the alternative

seems uh

Le uh thank you Kim uh now we are um

going to move for the um audience

question uh and I'm GNA start with you

Shir because I know you need to um hop

off this call uh there is a really good

question from nabila Al mullah from the

American University of Kuwait regarding

Ona and Shir you I know that you

recently in collaboration with Jess

manvil and Seline Tulu uh published this

report around hona and the question is

uh honor has a positive record as an

efficient administrator uh could its

role be supported and expanded by the

coal by the Coalition of the Willing

very quickly if you can tap on this

please okay so I'll just say the the

report on onra was not with Selen tuble

just with just Manville I don't

see I don't see HRA can expand uh for a

variety of reason it's not a sustainable

model uh their their beneficiaries keep

growing with their funding keeps uh

decreasing um there it's a big big

question and onra has been is going to

remain vital for the recovery and

reconstruction of Gaza but even you know

we interviewed for this report also

people working for unra and some things

unra does better than other agencies but

there's some things that in fact they

should um some of the services should be

distributed to other agencies um and

eventually with the whole right with

everything that we're talking about um

transition to a Palestinian state if in

Shah we ever see one

thank you we'll take another uh question

from um Jonathan Walters from the United

States around uh reconstruction and will

it be possible for some level of

cooperation uh from governments um um

Arab governments like Egypt or even from

Israel and what will dor countries have

to use uh with Egypt and Israel uh to

get that cooperation maybe I'm going to

go to ibraim for that question thank you

for uh

uh I think it's actually for governments

to decide whether it's Lo Community

Europe us um Arab countries wealthy Arab

countries and and the like but I think

frankly um as an observer I would

actually say that reconstruction is the

latter phase of you know that requires

first you stabilize the situation you

provide relief and then you start a

process and then you move to

reconstruction I I think president Biden

has even mentioned in his last speech uh

the urgent need for Sheltering for

basically relief before you get to

reconstruction now before that there is

the prerequisite of of getting to an

arrangement where uh hostilities end and

then you move to that so I think it's a

it's a far you know sort of like it's

not an immediate question and there are

so many different views and so many

different analysis in terms of how much

uh you know countries and how many of

those countries are willing uh to

contribute to a process of

reconstruction but I don't really see

any of that happening before we get

first to um end of hostilities uh you

know like relief and stabilization and

then moving to reconstruction so in some

ways you know it's a valid question but

it's a you know like it's a deferred uh

question because we have not even

started with uh first things first kind

of situation now thinking about it is

important planning for it is important

but um but I I

but I do think again that without moving

towards you know like a ladder starting

from from the bottom up we want to uh

even get to to to that stage

sadly uh thank you Brahim there are

really good question at the in the chat

unfortunately we will not be able to go

uh for all of these questions uh but

thank you so much uh for your engagement

and for the brilliant um you know

contribution uh that you had I'm going

to move to uh Steve right now over my

position to uh end this uh no one wants

to end uh and uh and also this is been

so important and yet we haven't been

able to answer all the questions and

we're going to try to figure out how to

do that either personally or uh in

another session or uh whatever but it

certainly shows us what the very great

problems are my list would be Gaza

Israeli pal Israeli EG uh Egypt uh the

whole problem of um uh uh the uh

situation uh for uh Palestinians in the

uh area that is in

controversy uh and Lebanon so that's uh

uh that's a lot uh that we have to uh uh

worry about and of course all of us have

been focusing on Gaza uh and it shows by

this discussion that there are more

problems as well and there are so many

opportunities uh we could only get this

uh settled so um uh it's been an

extremely important session and I feel

uh that I've learned a lot but we've got

to figure out how to answer those

questions uh this webinar was C's last

one for the Academic Year at least it

was before we began we look forward to

bringing you more relevant

thought-provoking content in the fall if

you have not already joined our mailing

list please send us a message at CED

international.

ucla.edu and it's right in front of you

we hope to see you

soon and uh we certainly will see you in

the fall and uh and uh we thank those

who have stayed till the end of because

this is such an important session and

there's been so much brought uh that we

have to solve 26 questions so um uh uh

we uh at our Center

are uh at cat are very much uh

understanding uh that we've got to do

more even though we're trying to do as

much as we can uh and uh we will do it